REDEFINING STRATEGIC CULTURE

by

Melanie Graham

BA University of British Columbia, 1996

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA

June 2014

Abstract

Strategic Culture has appealed to analysts since Jack Snyder first introduced the concept in his 1977 work "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations."[1] Researchers theorize that aspects of a society's culture can influence security policy and practice but have had difficulty producing a reliable and accepted definition. The difficulties with the concept could be lessened by agreeing on a concise definition and elaborating relationships between Strategic Culture and the factors that influence it.

This thesis proposes a causal relationship between a society's dominant strategic and biophysical environment, and the aspects of its culture that influence security priorities and preferences.

Thinking about security is impacted by predominating physical resources and strategic challenges and opportunities. Societies, therefore, develop a Strategic Culture – or shared core, political, social, and economic values and subsequent security preferences and priorities – specific to their unique environments.

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[1] J. Snyder, "*The Soviet strategic culture: Implications for limited nuclear operations.*," (RAND Corporation., 1977.).

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Acknowledgement

How does one begin to acknowledge a learning path that began long before I even knew I was on it? I am not a typical or traditional academic. This research is not a path actively chosen as an eager young student intent on an academic career. At the time of my first forays into post-secondary education I was more interested in being a visual artist and experiencing as much of the world as I could, as often as possible, and all at once whenever possible. That curiosity, however, also drove academic choices down many different paths such as fine arts, comparative religion, philosophy, history, and political science with the eventual destination the study of international relations. In any event, this has been a wonderful learning journey that eventually found meaning and direction in a fascination with the concept of Strategic Culture. I am convinced that it has great potential as a tool of comparative and practical analysis of social constructs that include state and non-state stakeholders in international relations.

There have been a few academic guides and many very patient mentors and friends who have been instrumental, for better and sometimes for worse, at pivotal moments in this academic experience. The core acknowledgement, however, must go to what I will describe as my own Strategic Culture

The defining cultural background of my own family as a first social construct has been a significant contributor to my approach to situational analysis. I spent my early and most formative years in Liberia and Pakistan influenced by family support staff from cultural environments very different to that of my immediate family. My mother and father spent their key formative years growing up respectively in Japan and India. The cumulative combination has made for an interesting perspective on beliefs, values, and priorities in a variety of social constructs and a somewhat eclectic appreciation of the world.

I became aware of the influence of the physical environment on individual and collective preferences and security choices very early in life as my mother raised four of us from a wheelchair. Planning everything from the logistics of day-to-day family activities, to home selection, community selection, and work distribution within the family unit, led all of us to instinctively consider the mobility and accessibility issues that were reality for a paraplegic mother.

Included in the family acknowledgement are all of my children. Not because they ever believed in what I was doing, though I suspect that at some level they do. Adults now, they are all too wonderfully caught up in their own growth and learning to pay much attention to my fascination with Strategic Culture. What they inadvertently gave me was a wonderful opportunity, over the course of their growing up, to study the evolution of their miniature social constructs in response to their expanding environment.

My employment as a naval officer with the Canadian Forces also helped to inform and shape some of my thoughts on Strategic Culture. I confess I much prefer Sun Tzu's philosophy of war fighting to that of Clausewitz.

Finally, no acknowledgement would be complete without recognizing the rich body of research that went on before my own. The literature review included in this thesis provides only a glimpse of the work done since 1977. This work has served as a strong foundation and starting point for my own research and analysis. I look forward to seeing what comes next.

Special thanks to my friend and associate Calvin.

Introduction

> "Done well, the careful analysis of Strategic Culture could help policymakers establish more accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played, reducing uncertainty and other information problems in strategic choice. Done badly, the analysis of Strategic Culture could reinforce stereotypes about strategic dispositions of other states and close off policy alternatives deemed inappropriate for dealing with local Strategic Cultures"[2]
> Alistair Iain Johnston 2005

Strategic Culture is a concept first introduced by Jack Snyder in his 1977 report, "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations."[3] His objective was to introduce a concept that would facilitate understanding and predictive capability on the part of American defence policy makers with regard to probable Soviet responses to American nuclear policy.

Research subsequent to Snyders' introduction has demonstrated consistent agreement on the existence and relevance of such a phenomenon, but theorists have struggled with consensus on a reliable definition. They continue to explore the possibilities of Strategic Culture as an analytic, and even predictive tool, while agreeing that it will be difficult to apply the concept in useful analyses without first establishing a reliable definition.

Previous research consistently frames the concept of Strategic Culture as a key factor in understanding security policy. It is taken generally to encompass perceptions, values, and attitudes relevant to security that are shared within a given society or community. advocates of the notion of Strategic Culture assume ti has an impact on security preferences, priorities, and policies. The concept makes intuitive sense. Shared

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[2] E. Stone, "Comparative strategic culture: A literature review (part 1)" (paper presented at the Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017., 2006). page 1.
[3] Snyder, "*The Soviet strategic culture: Implications for limited nuclear operations..*"; ibid.

values, perceptions and attitudes may very well influence the security decisions and choices made by officials. But. what are those values, responses, and behaviour patterns and where do they come from? How and why do they come to exist in a manner that will influence security preferences? What sorts of phenomena shapes the values and attitudes? What is the nature of Strategic Culture that may differentiates it from one culture or society to another?

<div align="center">Conceptual and Structural Weaknesses in Existing Definitions</div>

I contend that previous thinking on the concept of Strategic Culture, while often compelling, is conceptually and structurally incomplete. It lacks clarity or completeness to support reliable analysis.

According to Payne (1984), we need clearly defined concepts and variables to identify exactly what it is we need to observe in order to test our theories and help us establish the relationships between variables in a hypothesis.[4] In social science terminology, we need to both define our key concepts and establish both our independent and dependent variables.

> "Variables that are thought to change value in response to changes in other variables are referred to as dependent variables. Their value depends on the value of other variables. Variables that influence the value of other variables through changes in their own values are referred to as independent variables."[5]

> "Intervening variables provide the link between independent and dependent variables."[6]

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[4] J. B. Manheim, R.C.Rich, L. Willnat, C.L. Brians., *Empirical political analysis: Quanitative and qualitative research methods: Seventh edition.* (U.S.A.: Pearson Education Inc., 2008.). page 28
[5] Ibid. page 28
[6] Ibid. page 29

I will confine this thesis to proposing and supporting a redefinition of the concept of Strategic Culture that may be facilitate consistent and reliable comparative analysis and to exploring a key factor that influences this culture. I propose that the strategic and biophysical environment of a society constitutes a key variable shaping that society's Strategic Culture. It will not be possible here to explore the nature of relationships between Strategic Culture and subsequent security policies, as important as that step may be. That task will have to await further analysis.

Proposed Redefinition

I propose the following definition for the concept:

Strategic Culture is the shared, social, economic, and political values and priorities of a people, relevant to security preferences, as historically shaped and embedded by repeated interaction with and adaptation to their prevailing strategic and bio-physical environment.

This research must begin with an understanding of the concept of Strategic Culture and its conceptual components from the perspective of complementing academic disciplines. It will include analysis of the language used in previous definitions and an examination of the relationships posited between the relevant variables as well as a brief look at a few of the context specific attempts to apply the concept. This analysis will show the structural and conceptual weaknesses in previous definitions.

The literature review is addressed in chapter one and begins with a review of the Snyder report of 1977. It is followed by a review of two Strategic Culture conferences, one held by the Center for Contemporary Conflict, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School,

Monterey, CA, in 2005,[7] and the second, sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction

Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, in 2006.[8] The first conference was a

workshop to consider the utility and future role for comparative Strategic Culture theory

in U.S. defense strategy. The second was a conference to develop an academic syllabus

for a course that would introduce the concept of Strategic Culture to senior undergraduate

students studying international relations and security studies. The literature review

provides context for the development of the concept and the often implicit models in

which it is used.

Chapter two is an analysis and summary of the common analytic intent and shared

key concepts evident in the literature review, as well as common weaknesses that

researchers consistently agreed must be resolved in order to achieve a reliable definition.

It suggests that the shared cultural values, often presented in existing research as

independent variables, might instead be seen as intervening variables. Presenting shared

values as an independent variable that influences identity and security choices is only part

of what is arguably a more complete theoretical model. Chapter three borrows from

geography, and sociology to explore the historical influence of the strategic and

biophysical environment on the evolution of human communities and societies and on

their Strategic Cultures. These disciplines have long acknowledged the strategic and

biophysical environment as significant influences on the development and cultural

embedding of shared social, economic, and political values, preferences, and priorities. I

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[7] E. L. Stone, C.P.Twomey, P.R. Lavoy., "*Comparative strategic culture, conference report.*" (paper presented at the Center for Contemporary Conflict., 2005.).
[8] J. L. Johnson, "*Comparative strategic culture syllabus*," in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculm Project*, ed. J. A. Larsen (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Science Applications International Corporation, 2006).

argue this environment as has an influence on societies' Strategic Cultures and thus on security choices.

Chapter five concludes the thesis, summarizing the overall argument. The summary acknowledges that the proposed definition does not necessarily produce a predictive tool for behaviour in international relations. The proposed definition may, however, contribute to more efficient and effective comparative analysis and understanding of probable security preferences.

Theoretical Context

Strategic Culture is best defined and understood from a multidisciplinary perspective. Snyder first introduced the concept to help American defence policy makers better understand and predict probable Soviet responses to American nuclear policy. Researchers today seek a broader analytic tool to understand and, even predict, the behaviour of a range of global security actors. An expanded focus requires research on Strategic Culture to draw on concepts, hypotheses and terminology from a variety of academic disciplines so to contribute to a better understanding of human societies and communities as they relate to one another and to their repsective environments.

Social constructivism is the theoretical basis for the definition of Strategic Culture proposed in this thesis.

> "The focus of social constructivism (in shorthand: constructivism) is on human awareness or consciousness and its place in world affairs. Much IR-theory, and especially neorealism, is materialist; it focuses on how the distribution of material power, such as military forces and economic capabilities, defines balances of power between states and explains the behaviour of states. Constructivists reject such a one-sided material focus. They argue that the most important aspect of international relations is social, not material. Furthermore, they argue that this social reality is not objective, or external, to the observer of international affairs. The social and political world, including the world of international relations, is not a physical

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entity or material object that is outside human consciousness. Consequently, the study of international relations must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international scene as well as the shared understandings between them." [9]

It is particularly important to approach the concept of Strategic Culture from this theoretical context when confronted with an international community that is no longer the exclusive domain of state or state sanctioned actors. The concept has applicability at many levels and configurations.

The human preference for collective responses to security challenges has found historcial expression in the establishment of social constructs that range from the basic family unit, to the clan, the tribe, the state, and regional, politcal and economic associations. Strategic Culture aproached from a constructivist perspective is better positioned to understand the range of contemporary actors.

Relevance

The concept of Strategic Culture, though still lacking an agreed, concise, reliable definition, appears to have had sufficient intuitive relevance to draw the interest and research efforts of mainstream theorists such as Colin Gray, Jeffrey Lantis, Alistair Johnston, and Ken Booth, while attracting the attention of an expanding circle of new researchers.

The research done to date on Strategic Culture refers to a variety of anticipated benefits Elizabeth Stone, in summarizing the 2005 Monterey workshop on Strategic Culture, presented the workshop consensus that the "study of Strategic Culture would

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[9] Introduction to International Relations, Oxford Scholarship Online, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/ pg 162

lead to a comprehensive enough understanding to allow for prediction of other countries'

behaviors."[10] It was also agreed at the workshop that:

"the need to focus on non-state actor psychology as well as the differentiation between democracy and Islamic rule is further testament that Strategic Culture concepts, even if pursued to better understand state elites' decision making on foreign or WMD policy, has been and will remain a cultural argument at the most basic level. In the post-9/11 environment, "know thy enemy" has never rung more true, and the true implications of the aphorism can and must be further explored using dynamic, cross-discipline, and complex concepts such as comparative Strategic Culture if the national security of the United States is to be kept secure."[11]

Jeanie Johnson at the 2006 Comparative Strategic Culture Syllabus conference

identified that the sole purpose of the conference was to:

"advance Strategic Culture analysis as a tool for understanding (and even forecasting) the foreign policy of other actors and of constructing successful foreign policy of our own. Practical applications of Strategic Culture include:

- better understanding of the foreign lenses through which our policy moves will be viewed
- more effective deterrence, because we understand what the other culture values and can better leverage their cost/benefit ratio
- stronger cooperative relationships with allies
- increased accuracy in the interpretation of intelligence collected abroad
- insight that will allow for the creation of counter-narrative strategies aimed at weakening an adversary's propaganda campaign
- more successful assimilation of immigrants
- a stronger understanding of the repercussions of our foreign policy moves
- illumination of our own cultural values
- enhancement of predictive/forecasting capability." [12]

Colin Gray noted as early as 1984, that:

"It must be admitted that, as yet, it is unclear just how helpful studies of Strategic Culture may prove to be. However, it does not seem inappropriate to assert at least the following potential benefits:

- An improved understanding of our own, and other, cultures in local terms.

[10] Stone, "*Comparative strategic culture, conference report.*." ibid.page 6
[11] Ibid. page 21
[12] Johnson, "*Comparative strategic culture syllabus*." page 3

- An improved ability to discern enduring policy motivations and to make predictions.
- An improved ability to communicate what is intended to be communicated.
- An improved ability to understand the meaning of events in the assessment of others."[13]

Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU ARC), a stand-alone, university-wide applied research center in Miami, Florida, has recently established a research program, in partnership with the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), to explore and develop Strategic Culture as an analytic resource to better understand the behaviour of Latin American states.[14]

The global environment has changed dramatically in the past fifty years. The Cold War ended without major war. In its aftermath, however, and in the absence of a relatively stable bipolar balance of power, conflict has become more multi-faceted, highly mobile and asymmetric. The al-Quaeda attack on the World Trade Center in New York, September 11, 2001 was a violent confrontation, not between traditional states, but between a militant fundamentalist group and a very powerful, industrial state, making it very clear that actors in global affairs have expanded to include well equipped, technologically savvy, religious fanatics and terrorist organizations, with little to no respect for traditional rules of warfare. The response of the United States to the attack on the World Trade Center, furthermore, in many regards legitimized the status of al-Quaeda, with the declaration of a war against terror, elevating, what in traditional terms

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[13] C. Gray, "*Comparative strategic culture.*," *Parameters.* Winter 1984.(1984.). Page 30
[14] Marvin Astrada, "Strategic Culture: Concept and Application," Florida International University, http://strategicculture.fiu.edu/Approach/StrategicCultureConceptandApplication.aspx.

might otherwise be viewed as a criminal act, to a conflict between international stakeholders.

> "Some observers have expressed concern that treating terrorist acts as acts of war may legitimize the acts as a lawful use of force and elevate the status of the perpetrators and terrorist networks to that of legitimate state actors and lawful combatants."[15]

Technology has also bound the economic fortunes of the world together as currency, investments, and knowledge move around the world, from bank to business, from country to country, from individual to individual, in a matter of moments. Economic, political, and social health or disaster, in one state or region will have expanding repercussions, like the ripples in a pond from the toss of a single pebble. The same applies to environmental changes, such as drought, floods, tsunami, changing water levels, and earthquakes. Environmental disasters, natural and man-made, can devastate food production and trigger the migration of entire populations across sometimes hostile borders. A reliable definition of Strategic Culture has the potential to serve as a significant analytic tool for better understanding and potential deflection or mitigation of conflict in this increasingly complex, multicultural, global community of stakeholders competing for territorial, economic, ideological and environmental survival.

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[15] Jennifer Elsea, "Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals before Military Commissions," (Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 2001). page 2

Chapter One   Literature Review

A comprehensive review of the literature on Strategic Culture, if it was to include a full exploration of every attempt at analysis, description, or definition, would fill more than one sizeable book. Fortunately, in addition to Snyder's 1977 work, there have been two more recent collaborative efforts to better understand and define the concept. A review of these two conferences in addition to a review of the Snyder report will provide a historical context for the development of the concept.

The first and most relevant was a 2005 conference organized by the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) in Monterey, California. The objective of the conference was to explore the possibilities of Strategic Culture as a useful and reliable means of comparative analysis with regards to anticipating threat potential specific to the U.S. The conference organizers acknowledged that:

> "Despite the publication of many path-breaking books and scholarly articles on the subject of Strategic Culture, the research in this area has not cumulated into a coherent, productive field of study. The lack of cumulation is often the result of authors employing often very different conceptions of Strategic Culture and applying them to a single case study."[16]

The conference was unable to conclude with any kind of consensus on a definition. It did, however, produce three extensive literature reviews of the research done on the subject since its inception. A summary of these reviews provides an extensive and well-ordered summary of existing definitions and challenges relating to the development of the concept of Strategic Culture and will also be included in an analysis of previous research on Strategic Culture in chapter three.

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[16] Stone, "*Comparative strategic culture, conference report..*" page 1

The second collaborative effort was a 2006 undertaking by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to develop a curriculum for the study of Comparative Strategic Culture Analysis. Its related goal was to develop the concept as an analytic and predictive tool in the probable use of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. The efforts of the 2006 conference focused on a series of case studies that were context specific and therefore will be more relevant to later testing of the proposed definition subsequent to this thesis. The case studies themselves will also not be included in the literature review as they are context specific as opposed to concept specific. The case studies are useful, however, in two regards. First, they produced a series of questions the conference felt were relevant to students studying Strategic Culture. These questions will be explored as to their utility and relevance in advancing an understanding and application of the concept. The case studies were also linked to a working definition presented by the conference as sufficient to be the basis for developing a Strategic Culture curriculum. The curriculum definition stated that:

> "Strategic Culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives."[17]

This definition will be included in the analysis in this thesis of previous research on Strategic Culture as it is a reasonable and inclusive representation of the cumulative research on the subject.

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[17] Johnson, "*Comparative strategic culture syllabus*." page 3

Snyder and the Soviet Strategic Culture:

It is best to start a review of the research on Strategic Culture at the beginning with a review of the report in which it first materialized. Jack Snyder introduced the concept in 1977 in his report, 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations.[18]' At the time Snyder was engaged in graduate studies at Columbia's Russian Institute and contracted by the US Directorate of Operational Requirements to examine "the factors that might affect Soviet reactions to possible U.S. limited nuclear operations."[19] In the preface to his report Snyder indicated that he would make no attempt in his report to predict Soviet reactions but that he would concentrate instead on providing "a context for better understanding of the intellectual, institutional and strategic-culture determinants that would bound the Soviet decision making process in a crisis."[20] Snyder went on from this statement to indicate that he would also speculate "on the dominant behavioral propensities that would motivate – and constrain – the Soviet leaders during their efforts to cope with a situation where limited nuclear use by either side loomed as a possibility."[21]

Snyder defined Strategic Culture as:

"the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy."[22]

Snyder spent a good part of his report explaining the various methods he had contemplated to analyze Soviet attitudes toward limited nuclear war. He considered an

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[18] Snyder, "*The Soviet strategic culture: Implications for limited nuclear operations..*"
[19] Ibid. page iii
[20] Ibid. page iii
[21] Ibid. page iii
[22] Ibid. page 8

analysis of stated Soviet doctrine to be of limited value because of the inconsistent and

propagandist nature of the available doctrinal reports and his observation of a 'Soviet

propensity to lie.'

He then considered an analysis of Soviet responses to what he described as past

military crises as a possible indicator of Soviet nuclear doctrine. This however, appeared

to provide answers as ambiguous and unreliable as an analysis of Soviet declared

doctrine, in part because the history of Soviet specific actions was too brief and because

there had not been enough Soviet-specific military responses on the scale of a potential

nuclear exchange.

Snyder suggests technological factors influence Soviet nuclear doctrine, noting

that:

> "the Soviets themselves admit that the most significant factor leading to their
> renunciation of the doctrine of the inevitability of war has been the military
> technical revolution." [23]

Moreover, competing with the U.S. in an upward spiralling revolution in military

technology was becoming too costly..

In the end Snyder felt that the most reliable approach to an accurate understanding

of Soviet nuclear doctrine would lie in an analysis of their doctrinal writings and political

leadership speeches, in spite of the acknowledged inconsistent and propagandist nature of

the available doctrinal reports. He also felt that it would be advantageous to include in his

analysis an appreciation of the "intellectual history of Soviet strategic thought and a sense

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[23] Ibid. page 6

of the organizational and political criteria of Soviet decision making" [24] as a basis for understanding Soviet attitudes to limited use of nuclear weapons as a strategic option. He turned to the notion of a Strategic Culture unique to the Soviet Union as a necessary component of an analysis of their doctrinal and political writings.

Snyder admitted in his report that there were insufficient case studies for effective analysis. He also conceded that state doctrinal statements and actions were too ambiguous and unreliable to be a basis for effective analysis. He felt, however, that by placing an analysis of Soviet doctrine and leadership speeches in the context of Strategic Culture, or *"the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour"* [25] of Soviet leadership, he could come up with a better understanding of their probable response to U.S. nuclear policy.

He went on in his analysis to point out that a "comprehensive sociology and intellectual history of Soviet strategic thought goes far beyond the scope"[26] of his report. He confined his analysis, therefore, to the social, political, and technological history of the Soviet Union specifically as it related to U.S. nuclear policy. Snyder admitted, even as he presented his methodology that "the report's substantive conclusions about Soviet attitudes toward limited nuclear war are far more tentative."[27] He concluded that, on the basis of a history of insecurity and authoritarian control, Soviet Strategic Culture placed greater emphasis on the use of unilateral first strike damage limiting strategies when faced with the threat of nuclear war as opposed to the deterrent of significant counter

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[24] Ibid. page 8
[25] Ibid. page 8
[26] Ibid. page 8
[27] Ibid. page 4

strike capability. If nuclear war was imminent, the Soviets believed it was better to have the capability to hit first and hit hard with an all out nuclear attack on the U.S. rather than rely on a capacity to react to a U.S. first strike. Economic factors, however, reconciled them to accept a doctrine of deterrence. Snyder acknowledged the existence of what he called a countervailing Soviet strategic subculture, apparent in Soviet writings, which did not support nuclear pre-emptive capability. This subculture, however, was external to government and the military so he chose to disregard it, as he believed it lacked the bureaucratic or political strength to have a relevant voice in Soviet policy.

Monterey Conference 2005

In September, 2005 the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) in Monterey, California, organized a workshop on Comparative Strategic Culture. The conference brought together a variety of subject matter experts to consider the "utility and future role for comparative Strategic Culture theory in U.S. defense strategy"[28] Their efforts, though productive, concluded that it was still not possible to arrive at any kind of consensus on a preliminary definition of Strategic Culture. Participants agreed, however, that a better appreciation of the Strategic Culture of an adversary would be useful in the development of successful policy relating to that adversary. The U.S.-centric priorities of the conference focused the need for further research in the context of a U.S. view of the post 9/11 world.

The conference also recognized the need to re-examine culture as a legitimate tool of policy analysis. Participants concluded that it would be better to approach culture, not

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[28] Stone, "*Comparative strategic culture, conference report.*."page 2

as a single system defined by nationality or state borders, but as one regionally defined, and shaped by a "conglomerate of co-existing variables, with each major regional and cultural area resonating with its own Strategic Culture."[29]

The final report of the conference concluded that, while it fell short of achieving a consensus definition, it confirmed the need for one. The concept of Strategic Culture, if it was ever to be used successfully as an analytic tool for policy development, had to be defined in a clear way. The conference identified two issues that the participants felt needed to be resolved.

"First, where does the culture in question lie?

Second, where does the behaviour that it shapes exist?"[30]

The conference participants produced three literature reviews of value to future research: the first by Elizabeth Stone of the Naval Postgraduate School, the second by Jeffrey Lantis of the University of Wooster, and the third by Darryl Howlett of Southampton University.

<div align="center">Stone Literature Review: The Field So Far</div>

Stone identified what she called three waves of literature on the concept of Strategic Culture. These waves of literature are presented, by wave, to show the evolution of research on the concept while confirming the unresolved struggle for consensus in definition. The different perspectives are also illustrative, however, of the common descriptive variables frequently employed by different theorists discussing the concept.

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[29] ibid. page 2
[30] ibid. page 4

The First Wave took place in the early 1980's and was state specific and explanatory in nature, most often seeking a better understanding of the differences in American and Soviet nuclear strategy. The dominant view held that these differences were the result of "unique variations in macro-environmental variables such as deeply rooted historical experience, political culture, and geography."[31]

In addition to the assertion that the concept, as presented in early research was unwieldy, Stone also identified two other shortcomings that were prevalent in this first wave of literature.

Patterns of behaviour were included within the definition, implying that strategic thought led consistently to one type of behaviour. This formulaic approach was at odds with circumstances where thought and action were inconsistent with each other and was open to so many potential exceptions as to be insupportable.

There was also a problematic assumption that there was homogeneity to a society's Strategic Culture that carried across time. This assumption supposed that multiple inputs resulted in a static and uniform Strategic Culture unaffected by changing social, economic or political characteristics within a given society.

The Second Wave of literature occurred in the mid 1980's and began to move research beyond efforts to define the concept to attempts to determine its potential as a reliable predictor of strategic decision making.

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[31] Elizabeth Stone, *Comparative Strategic Culture: A Literature Review, Part I,* Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, page 1.

The key premise was "that there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper motives for what in fact they do."[32] Implicit in this new direction was an acknowledgement of levels or tiers of Strategic Culture distinguished by the perceptions and objectives of analysts. As such Strategic Culture began to be viewed as a tool of "political hegemony" [33] in strategic planning. Political leaders could use the concept as justification to legitimize the use of violence against alleged enemies. In other words, the concept could be used by the dominant political tier in a society to provoke public perception of an external threat as justification for the use of violence to support their own ends.

The work of Colin Gray, (1984), was identified as key to the second wave of research. Gray identified Strategic Culture in the context of the United States as:

> "referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perceptions of the national historical experience, aspirations for cultural conformity (e.g. as an American, what am I and how should I feel, think, and behave?), and from all of the many distinctively American experiences (of geography, political philosophy and practice [i.e. civic culture], and way of life) that determine an American culture."[34]

Alistair Ian Johnston (1995)[35] referenced this and some treatments of the first wave as being unwieldy in part because they tried to include so many variables as relevant. These included:

> "Technology, geography, organizational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, political culture, national character, political psychology, ideology, and

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[32] Ibid page 1
[33] Ibid page 1
[34] Gray, "*Comparative strategic culture..*" page 28
[35] A. I. Johnston, "*Thinking about strategic culture*," *International Security* Vol. 19, no. No. 4 Spring (1995).

even international system structure were all considered relevant inputs into this amorphous Strategic Culture."[36]

Stone also identified problematic areas in this body of second wave literature. Among them were attempts to link culture and behaviour. Does Strategic Culture influence behaviour? The elite that led strategic decision making within a given society had been socialized in, and were therefore constrained by, the same symbolic myths and traditions of the previous generation of elite within the society. While it was accepted that the elite specific diffusion of myths and traditions could result in differences between the social strata in national behavior, it was not clear whether this meant one should expect cross-national differences in strategy. The notion of continuity in myths and traditions among the elite in a society also perpetuated the tendency to link Strategic Culture with political and military interests.

The Third Wave of literature was described by Stone as "more rigorous and eclectic in its conceptualization of ideational independent variables"[37] while focusing narrowly on specific strategic decisions as "dependent variables."[38]

The literature also tended to be critical of realist and structural materialist thinking as inadequate to explain strategic choices. The literature managed to avoid the deterministic nature of the first wave and showed a commitment to competitive theory testing. The third wave of literature, however, like the first and second, also had problematic areas. The focus on the weakness of realism was referred to as flawed and dependence on organizational culture as a key independent variable in strategic planning

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[36] Ibid. page 37
[37] Ibid page 41
[38] Ibid page 41

was described as troublesome. Ultimately, the literature was still unable to come up with a reliable definition for Strategic Culture.

The Way Ahead

Stone went on in her analysis to identify what she saw as the most productive future path of Strategic Culture research and the areas of focus that were most likely to resolve identified problematic issues. Many of these areas have found their way into research that has taken place since 2006. But, as the conference concluded, research in these areas still could not support an adequate definition.

Stone identified three key areas of future research that would help to bring the concept of Strategic Culture closer to a reliable definition.

1. There was a need to learn from past literature. Stone referred to a need for more critical exploration of the literature on pre-existing theoretical and state specific definitions of Strategic Culture in the context of the historical periods in which they were written.

2. Stone also pointed out a need to use cross discipline studies. She identified a historical tendency to confine research on Strategic Culture to the theoretical perspective of political science and international relations. Stone suggested that this represented a bias that could limit adequate exploration of the concept, isolating research and analysis from the potential benefit of related and complementing work in other fields such as anthropology, sociology, psychology and history.

3. The third point identified a need to adopt a more inclusive approach to the concept that recognized its relevance in application to non-state actors in an

analysis of strategic decision making. International relations was no longer

regarded as the exclusive domain of state stakeholders.

Ken Booth, in his 1994 article "Security and Self Reflections of a Fallen Realist,"[39]

articulated this shift to a more inclusive approach to the study of international relations

and security studies.

> "Having been brought up on the state-centric and militarised news media and popular culture of the Cold War, my generation of international relations students was primed to believe that a theory of what, in Aron's phase `diplomats and soldiers' did, explained world affairs . . . .
>
> `States are the most powerful actors' was (and remains) a basis of the realist litany. However, the more I thought about the individual cases which are the staple of AI's (Amnesty International) work, the more I thought about the significance of thinking about international relations from the perspective of individuals rather than states. . . .
>
> The individual/bottom up/victim perspective began to change what I thought about the state, state types, social power, other security problems than the military inventories of the superpowers, the state as the exclusive security referent, and states as a source of threat rather than as a source of security. The sovereign state came to be seen as an important part of the problem of insecurity, not the solution."[40]

Researchers began to realise the importance of an inclusive perspective, as opposed

to the traditional state-centric realist perspective, which would have limited application

when civil war and ethnic or tribal rivalries transform the state as a source of security to a

source of profound human insecurity. Moreover, Strategic Culture analysis needed to

take into account the number and instances of non-state players, including terrorists,

insurgencies, and pirates increasingly impacted international security.

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[39] K. Booth, "*Security and self reflections of a fallen realist.*," in *Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security Studies.* (York University, Toronto, Ontario.: Centre for International and Strategic Studies., 1994.).
[40] Ibid. page 11

Lantis Literature Review: Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism

Jeffrey Lantis took a longer historical look at the concept in his literature review, aptly titled "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism."[41] He paid particular attention to the evolution of the theoretical context in which definitions have been attempted, from the "Clausewitzian" state centric perspective to the beginnings of a more human centric or constructivist perspective. He divided his review of the literature into two specific areas of interest, starting with the concept of 'Political Culture' as a pre-existing but related concept, as a preface to his subsequent exploration of what he called 'Third Generation Studies' in Strategic Culture. He concluded with three important questions.

1. Who are the keepers of Strategic Culture?

2. Is Strategic Culture a fixed and static phenomenon of human societies or an evolving and transformative one?

3. What is the universality of Strategic Culture? Can researchers define it in a way that supports consistent and reliable application?

Political Culture

Lantis traced the origins of Strategic Culture as far back as the classical writings of Thucydides and Sun Tzu. He contended that Clausewitz had advanced the idea of a national or political culture when he recognized war and war-fighting strategy as "a test of moral and physical forces."[42] By this he meant the resource capacity and will of a state

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[41] J. S. Lantis, "*Strategic culture: From Clausewitz to constructivism.*," *Strategic Insights.* Volume IV., no. Issue 10. (2005.); ibid.
[42] ibid. page 2

to follow through on the use of force to do more than simply defeat an enemy on the battlefield. A state had to be prepared to defeat an enemy so totally that it no longer had the means or the will to constitute a further threat.

According to Lantis, Strategic Culture notions first appeared in contemporary research in the 1940s and 1950s as "national character studies." This work represented some of the earliest efforts to make a connection between state behaviour and culture. The research on national character drew heavily on anthropology and identified a nation's language, customs, socialization, and shared memories as the source of its national character.

Next referenced in the chronology was the work, "Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations" by Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba[43] that had represented a ground-breaking study of the concept of political culture when first published in 1963. They defined it as "the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes to the role of the self in the system . . . a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes."[44] The ideas and beliefs that were included in that orientation were: values; democratic principles and institutions; ideas about morality and the use of force; the rights of individuals versus those of the community or collective; and a pre-established notion of the role of a country in international or global politics.

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[43] G. A. Almond, S.Verba., ed. *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations.* (USA.: Sage Publications., 1989).
[44] Ibid. page 12

In further tracing the development of the concept of political culture Lantis went on to cite anthropologist Clifford Geertz's influential work of 1973[45] where he defined culture as:

> "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life."[46]

According to Lantis, the 1980's saw the growing popularity of interdisciplinary research linking culture and politics. Theorists like sociologist Ann Swidler introduced the use of "more complex models of connections between culture and state behaviour" mediated by cultural "strategies of action."[47] Lantis cited Swidlers' 1986 work where she defined culture as:

> "symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life."[48]

Swidler saw culture as an agency that

> "influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or "tool kit" of habits, skills and styles from which people construct "strategies of action."[49]

This repertoire or tool kit becomes integrated or embedded into a culture based on a history of successful application to the point where it becomes the habitual response strategy for a specific range or pattern of conditions or circumstances.

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[45] C. Geertz, *The interpretation of cultures.* (New York, NY.: Basic Books., 1973.).
[46] Ibid. page 89
[47] Lantis, "*Strategic culture: From Clausewitz to constructivism.*."
[48] A. Swidler, "*Culture in action: Symbols and strategies.*," *American Sociological Review.* Vol. 51., no. No. 2. (1986). page 273
[49] Ibid. page 273

Third Generation Strategic Culture

In the 1990's there was a resurgence of interest in Strategic Culture that Lantis described as the Third Generation Studies, similar to the Third Wave described by Stone, and attributed to the growing popularity of Constructivism as a theoretical context for understanding state behaviour and international relations. Theorists like Alexander Wendt went so far as to propose that Constructivism represented a paradigmatic challenge to the historically dominant theoretical context of Neorealism as a basis for understanding international relations. The international community was no longer the exclusive domain of states but included a complex variety of often competing social units. The Neorealist view of an international structure acting as some kind of constraint on state behaviour had limited application when the stakeholders were no longer exclusively state actors with objectives that fell outside the range of the state centric.

Lantis credited Theo Farrell with a more recent assessment of the increased popularity of constructivism. Farrell identified it as a blend of what he called "culturalism" and Constructivism that allowed international relations theorists to

> "view actors and structure much differently than the rationalist approaches to international relations . . . locating actors in a social structure that both constitutes those actors and is constituted by their interactions."[50]

Lantis presented a model in which the individual shapes the society which in turn shapes the individual. Successful individual preferences and actions become reinforced as an embedded cultural component that subsequently shapes the choices of individuals within that society.

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[50] Lantis, "*Strategic culture: From Clausewitz to constructivism.*" page 4

Lantis identified an article by Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History" (1995) "as the quintessential third generation work on Strategic Culture."[51] Johnston, in this article, set out to investigate the existence and character of Chinese Strategic Culture in the expectation of finding causal linkages to the use of military force against external threats. In doing so he identified the concept of Strategic Culture as a relevant "ideational milieu that limits behavioural choices," from which "one could derive specific predictions about strategic choice."[52] Johnston argued Strategic Culture was a conceptual frame of reference specific to a society that would so determine strategic choices that analysis in a given security scenario would enable specific response prediction.

Lantis pointed out that Johnston, in addition to defining Strategic Culture as a set of shared assumptions and decisions, also acknowledged the existence of strategic sub-cultures for which "there is a generally dominant culture whose holders are interested in preserving the status quo."[53] The recognition of subcultures within a given Strategic Culture was a positive departure from the earlier assumption in the first wave of literature that there was a homogeneity to a society's Strategic Culture. It was a recognition that a society is shaped by multiple inputs that will not have the same impact on the different social, economic or political tiers in a social hierarchy, but will instead produce similar hierarchical tiers of Strategic Culture. The dominant tier will make strategic choices that

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[51] Ibid. page 4
[52] A. I. Johnston, *Cultural realism, strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history.* (Princeton University Press., 1995.). page 36
[53] Lantis, "*Strategic culture: From Clausewitz to constructivism..*" Page 6

will maintain the status quo insofar as the choices maintain the conditions that ensure their continued dominance.

<div align="center">Three Questions</div>

Lantis concluded his literature review of Strategic Culture with three questions that he felt must be answered in order to understand the concept.First he asked "Who are the Keepers of Strategic Culture?"

If, as Lantis contended, Strategic Culture is an "important ideational source of national predispositions, and thus of national security policy,"[54] then what elements of a society "define and control these cultural foundations of state behaviour."[55] Who are the Keepers of Strategic Culture? If one can accept that the concept is relevant to political and security analysis, then it would be of value to identify what it is that shapes the principal actors in a society, the political leaders and institutions, responsible for the cumulative and historical development of the foreign and defence policy path.

Lantis cited Thomas Berger's work on policy discourse where he identified Strategic Culture as a "negotiated reality"[56] among elites. Leaders are usually obliged to respect deeply held societal convictions or core beliefs such as multilateralism and historical responsibilities such as traditional allies, shared ideological or environmental values and priorities, and shared ethnicity. The pattern of historical behaviour for many

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[54] Ibid. page 7
[55] Ibid. page 7
[56] T. U. Berger, *Cultures of antimilitarism: National security in Germany and Japan.*, (Johns Hopkins University Press., 1998),
http://books.google.ca/books?id=smj0brV0hEUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Cultures+of+Antimilitarism:+National+Security+in+Germany+and+Japan&source=bl&ots=zuL18KIuAV&sig=n9Tz22LcSteBobjZzNax UBJHzUA&hl=en&ei=BnKZTIicA5KenQfMgKn3Dw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false.

countries, however, shows that leaders can opportunistically choose when and where to justify choices on the basis of strategic, cultural traditions. The leading elite can also decide when and where to consciously push beyond previous boundaries of accepted foreign policy behaviour.

Lantis then presented the question of continuity or change. Is Strategic Culture static or does it evolve? To answer this he referred to Harry Eckstein's 1988 article 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change' where Eckstein wrote,

> "the socialization of values and beliefs occurs over time. Past learning becomes sedimented in the collective consciousness and is relatively resilient to change."[57]

Lantis countered this observation with the recognition that change, over time, is possible. Historical memory, political institutions, and multilateral commitments, although not easily or quickly changed, are not static. They also shape Strategic Culture. It follows then, that the foreign policies shaped by evolving Strategic Cultures are also undergoing what Lantis calls "enduring transformation."

If Strategic Culture can change, are there circumstances that might bring about sudden or unexpected change? Lantis refers to his own research when he identifies two conditions that might bring about what he calls 'Strategic Culture dilemmas' that might result in changes to security policy. The first is external shocks that could significantly change core beliefs and undermine traditionally accepted historical narratives.

The second circumstance would occur when primary tenets of strategic thought come into direct conflict with one another. In other words,

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[57] Lantis, "*Strategic culture: From Clausewitz to constructivism.*." page 8

"a country with interpretive codes of support for democracy and an aversion to the use of military force faces a strategic cultural dilemma when confronted by a challenge to democracy that necessitates a military response."[58]

The final question included in Lantis' literature review is that of the universality of Strategic Culture. Is it a phenomenon restricted to individual states or can non-state or multi-state actors have a Strategic Culture? He referred to the case of the European Union and the efforts to form a common European Security Strategy (ESS), formalized in 2003. He suggested that the members of the European Union may never be able to agree on a common perception of threat or shared strategic interests but countered with the view of Cornish and Edwards (2001) that

"there are signs that a European Strategic Culture is already developing through a socialization process."[59]

Lantis presented an insightful review of the theoretical development of the concept of Strategic Culture. He was able to provide some satisfaction with regards to his closing questions but, like Stone, he also identified areas of research that would require further attention if the concept was ever to mature enough to find reliable and consistent usage in comparative analysis. First and foremost among the underdeveloped areas of research was the need for a common definition. Associated with the need for a definition was a comparable need to identify a measurable process by which a Strategic Culture is created, maintained, and passed on to subsequent generations.

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[58] Ibid. page 8
[59] Ibid. page 9

Darryl Howlett placed his literature review in the context of what he called the profound transformations of the twentieth century, noting that, in addition to two world wars, we have also seen a third development, the Cold War, resolved without fully engaged conflict between the two contending super powers. He proposed that these events, especially the comparatively peaceful resolution of the third, have had a transformative impact on twenty-first century understanding of the world. Any attempt to present Strategic Culture as a relevant tool of analysis must take place in a broader exploration of this transformation in international relations and critical security studies. Later in his review Howlett included the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre as yet another transformative event influencing the role of the state and the changed nature of conflict. Strategic Culture research, Howlett suggested, must take place within a re-evaluation of realist and neorealist thought. This recommendation echoes one of the problematic areas defined by Stone in the third wave of literature on Strategic Culture.

Howlett identified two general trends in the approach used by theorists using the concept of Strategic Culture. There were those who applied the concept without specifying a concise meaning or identifying the influence of cultural conditions on strategic choices. Their interpretation of the concept aimed at providing an enhanced understanding of "the domestic cultural context in influencing strategic outcomes."[60]

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[60] D. Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature.*," *Strategic Insights.* Volume IV., no. Issue 10. (2005.). page 2

The second approach was more concerned with first establishing a conceptual and policy relevant understanding of Strategic Culture. The emphasis here was on the development of an understanding of the concept as a measurable relationship between culture and strategic choices. Such an improved understanding would not only enhance interpretive and predictive analysis of strategic choices but would also make it possible to apply the concept as a comparative analytic tool.

Howlett suggested that, while it may not be possible to reach agreement on an underlying core concept of Strategic Culture, it may be possible "to establish a middle range theoretical and policy range knowledge."[61]

Howlett went on to cite the 2005 work of Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, 'Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,'[62] to support his advocacy of the development of generic knowledge in order to establish common ground.   His reference to the benefits of a collaborative and cross discipline perspective to Strategic Culture research also reflects a recurring theme in the first two literature reviews referenced in this paper.

<div align="center">Strategic Culture Trends and Issues</div>

Howlett explored what he referred to as the trends and issues in the recent literature that are influencing current research on Strategic Culture. He identified what he believed were the three key trends in Strategic Culture research. The first was to approach Strategic Culture from a traditional state centric perspective and see it strictly

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[61] Ibid. page 1

[62] A. Bennett, A.L. George., *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.* (The MIT Press., 2005.).

"in terms of its capacity to add greater historical and cultural detail of developments operating within the state but are seeking only to supplement material based analysis based on interest and the distribution of power. Strategic Culture is here understood as a variable that may influence behavior but is regarded as having secondary significance to the material structure."[63]

The relevance of the concept was secondary to that of the material structure of society, or the relationships among people in relation to the physical world.

The second trend was to develop an approach to Strategic Culture research based on cumulative research and application. This approach saw Strategic Culture as an independent variable and actor behaviour as a subsequent dependent variable. This view also saw greater utility in a cultural explanation for behaviour than do more traditional realist explanations of behaviour held by adherents to the first trend.

The third trend was for researchers to appreciateactors' behaviour by becoming immersed in their cultural experience, by analyzing both what they said, and what they did not say, in order to better understand their choices and actions.

Can Transnational Actors Have Strategic Cultures?

Howlett went on his review to note that there was also a growing interest to improve on thinking about Strategic Culture by considering a framework for analysis that could be applied at a regional or transnational level. This interest reflected the aligning of like minded states in regional associations to better support region-specific shared priorities and objectives.

To support regional or transnational analysis, Howlett made multiple references to a series of articles in a special 2005 edition of 'Cooperation and Conflict' dedicated to

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[63] Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature..*" page 2

exploring Nordic Strategic Culture. [64] The special issue looked at the respective and related Strategic Cultures of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The study represented what Howlett described as a significant collaborative venture between researchers in states in the Nordic region. He identified regional or transnational analysis as an emerging trend in research with reference to an article published the same year by Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards exploring the Strategic Culture of the European Union.[65] He saw this trend in Strategic Culture research as significant because it suggested the concept was not necessarily defined exclusively by state borders but could exist as a collective, regionally defined, phenomenon.

Howlett mentioned two other factors as relevant influences on the concept of Strategic Culture in threat analysis. One was the internet and the other the changing face of conflict itself. Agents of threat were no longer confined to state actors. Non-state groups and even individuals could present lethal threats to local, national and regional security.

Howlett, in referencing the impact of the internet, cited the argument of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt that "the information revolution is altering the nature of conflict across the spectrum."[66] The information age has seen the networked, and less centralized organizational structure begin to supplant the traditional and often state-centric, top-down, hierarchical power model, making the successful conduct of conflict

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[64] J. Glenn Åselius G., N.Græger, H. Heikka, D. Howlett, H. Leira, I.B. Neumann, M.V. Rasmussen., "*Special issue on Nordic strategic culture.*," *SAGE Journals Online: Cooperation and Conflict.* 40, no. 1 (2005.).

[65] P. Cornish, G. Edwards., "*The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report.*," *International Affairs.* Vol. 81., no. Issue 4. (2005.).

[66] Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature..*" page 8

more and more dependent on networked information and lateral and bottom up lines of communication. Arquilla and Ronfeldt believed that

"information-age threats are likely to be more diffuse, dispersed, multi-dimensional nonlinear, and ambiguous than industrial-age threats."[67]

Howlett also addressed the dilemma, in using Strategic Culture in an analyisis of the transformed 21st century face of conflict, of the increasing tendency, especially in the U.S., to view terrorists not as criminals outside the laws of nations, but as armed enemies.

The Sources of Strategic Culture

Possibly the most significant aspect of the literature review by Howlett was his summary of what he called the sources of Strategic Culture. By these he was referring to those agencies that he believed shaped Strategic Culture within in a society or a state. He prefaced a list of the most commonly identified sources with a distinction between ideational and material sources. His list included:

1. Geography

2. Climate and resources

3. History and experience

4. Political structure

5. The nature of organizations involved in defense

6. Myths and symbols

7. Key texts that inform actors of appropriate strategic action

8. Transnational norms, generational change and the role of technology

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[67] Ibid. page 9

Howlett believed that such an extensive list of possible influences on Strategic Culture could significantly challenge attempts at theory building. He recommended, as a preliminary solution for this explanatory complexity, that the variables be prioritized according to assumed importance of impact.

Howlett recognized that the first on his list of variables, geography, was key to shaping Strategic Culture.

> "the significance of geography, climate, and resources has been a key element in strategic thinking throughout the millennia and [they] remain important sources of Strategic Culture in the current era."[68]

Howlett also acknowledged that proximity to great powers, access to vital resources, and the nature and number of a state's territorial borders were enduring and significant geographic factors that have historically motivated strategic considerations.

Are Strategic Cultures immutable or do they change over time?

Howlett pointed out in his review that one argument that frequently faced attempts to define Strategic Culture was a tendency for theorists to present the concept as a complex and deterministic phenomenon impermeable to change.

Howlett also felt that it was difficult to understand "the dynamic relationship between cultural identities, different types of behavior and strategic outcomes." [69] He noted the emergence in recent literature, however, of a growing inclination to use sociology and anthropology particularly to develop a more dynamic understanding of culture as it relates to strategic thinking. Of particular relevance to his review in this regard was the 2005 article by Iver Neuman and Henrikki Heikka, "Grand Strategy,

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[68] Ibid. page 4
[69] Ibid. page 7

Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence." Howlett suggested previous work on Strategic Culture had been using an outdated concept of culture that was taken as a given in analysis and accepted as an entrenched material fact so that "the literature on Strategic Culture does not (yet) give us the kind of dynamic and specific framework for empirical analysis that we need."[70]

Howlett also cited the Neumann and Heikka suggestion that while current models treat culture as a homogeneous phenomenon, it is better approached "not as the stable product of a homogeneous process inside a clearly limited nation-state, but rather as an unstable compromise of a contested transnational type." [71]

Strategic Culture: Developing a Framework for the Future?

Howlett proposed at the end of his literature review that future research would benefit from embracing related developments in other disciplines. The accumulation "of inter-disciplinary knowledge in individual, country, regional, cross regional and transnational setting"[72] would help to develop a much-needed theoretical precision in Strategic Culture research.

Another challenge in taking an interdisciplinary approach is a risk of oversimplifying social analysis and relying on broad, categorical generalizations. Such could lead to misinterpretation, and even stereotyping, against which Lantis had cautioned.

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[70] I. B. Neumann, H. Heikka., "*Grand strategy, strategic culture, practice : The social roots of Nordic defence.*," *Cooperation and Conflict.* 40., no. 5. (2005.). Page 6
[71] Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature.*." Page 7
[72] Ibid. page 9

"Done badly, the analysis of Strategic Culture could reinforce stereotypes about strategic dispositions of other states and close off policy alternatives deemed inappropriate for dealing with local Strategic Cultures"[73]

Howlett, as a remedy against this risk, proposed a methodology for future research called process mapping. Once again he referred to the work of George and Bennet. Process mapping involves "theoretically informed historical research to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to an outcome."[74] Through process mapping he believed it would be possible to trace the processes that generated outcomes in specific case studies and then link the resultant observations in a case specific explanation.

Howlett reiterated his view of Strategic Culture as a dynamic and mutable phenomenon existing at various levels or tiers within most states as opposed to a single static and homogenous state-specific expression of strategic preferences. He also concluded that the concept had transnational and non-state application.

In terms of future research, Howlett recommended the development of actor specific behavioural models for different adversaries. He pointed out that adversaries would come in an increasing variety of guises. It was important to recognize and understand the critical features unique to each actor when undertaking analysis, especially as it related to the development of security policy. "Simple assumptions that one is dealing with rational or unitary actors may be particularly dangerous when one is dealing with non-state actors, such as warlords, terrorists, or rivals in civil wars."[75]

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[73] Stone, "Comparative strategic culture: A literature review (part 1)." page 3
[74] Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature..*" page 9
[75] Ibid. page 10

Curriculum Conference 2006 Review

The objective of the 2006 curriculum conference was to provide a theoretical

background and comparative framework for the concept of Strategic Culture as the basis for

academic study. The focus, however, was to be on comparative analysis of case studies

exploring state (and one non-state actor) "decisions to acquire, proliferate, or use a weapon of

mass destruction" in order to better understand and forecast the foreign policy of others and

thereby construct more robust U.S. foreign policy. Several specific outcomes were

anticipated from the research that would come from the proposed curriculum:

1.　better understanding of the foreign lenses through which policy moves will be

viewed

2.　more effective deterrence, because we understand what the other culture values

and can better leverage their cost/benefit ratio

3.　stronger cooperative relationships with allies

4.　increased accuracy in the interpretation of intelligence collected abroad

5.　insight that will allow for the creation of counter-narrative strategies aimed at

weakening an adversary's propaganda campaign

6.　more successful assimilation of immigrants

7.　a stronger understanding of the repercussions of our foreign policy moves

8.　illumination of our own cultural values

9.　enhancement of predictive/forecasting capability" [76]

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[76] Johnson, "*Comparative strategic culture syllabus*." page 3

Curriculum Definition

The curriculum conference presented what participants agreed was an adequate

definition to support further research. As noted above:

> "Strategic Culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives." [77]

Curriculum Questions

This thesis and the literature review will not include a review of the case studies

included in the curriculum reading. It is worthwhile, however, to consider the questions

proposed as study guides for a review of the case studies. It was agreed that academic

discussion of these questions would advance Strategic Culture as a useful field of study.

1. How is state identity formed? Which factors are primary influences? How does this affect security policy?

2. How do values become policy? Can significant gaps exist between policy that is aspired to, and policy that is actuated?

3. To what extent do global norms impact domestic Strategic Culture?

4. How static/dynamic is Strategic Culture? What causes change? How quickly can Strategic Culture shift in a crisis?

5. To what extent can leaders leverage and/or manipulate Strategic Culture for their own ends?

6. Can the Strategic Culture analytical framework be applied to non-state actors?

Additional discussion questions:

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[77] Ibid. page 3

1. Does each culture develop its own way of war?

2. How does one discern the "keepers" or "stewards" of a particular Strategic Culture? Are they persons? Or institutions? How is the socialization process perpetuated?

3. To what extent does geography determine Strategic Culture?

4. How do the market forces of globalization affect Strategic Culture? Are there emerging non-Western perspectives that might counter the power of globalization?

5. Is the Strategic Culture in question relatively homogenous, or factionalized? If disparate groups are competing for the ability to direct security policy, how might one determine which viewpoint will be most relevant?

6. Can significant portions of Strategic Culture be innovated? Taught from the top levels of government down, and internalized?

7. How might intelligence and diplomatic processes be improved to unearth accurate data on Strategic Culture?

8. If we assume that there are three levels of analysis in studying a country's Strategic Culture—our own, our adversaries, and our allies—do we tend to overlook our allies?

Chapter Two   Literature Review Analysis

          Snyder Analysis

Snyder introduced the concept of Strategic Culture in his 1977 report in response to

a very specific context. In terms of historical timelines, his report, sponsored by the

United States Air Force, was commissioned following the 1972 signing, by the U.S. and

Soviets, of the Strategic Arms limitation Treaty (SALT I). 1977 was also the year U.S.

President Jimmy Carter began two years of negotiations with Soviet Chairman Leonid

Brezhnev to curtail the production of strategic nuclear weapons. Snyder's objective,

under the circumstances, was to provide U.S. security policy makers with "a context for

better understanding of the intellectual, institutional and strategic-culture determinants

that would bound the Soviet decision making process in a crisis."[78] The context was

specific, not only to Soviet security preferences, but to those preferences as they related

to proposed U.S. nuclear policy during protracted negotiations to stand down the threat of

nuclear war. Actual Soviet responses to proposed U.S. nuclear policy were not

conforming to anticipated responses. Snyder surmised that the unexpected Soviet

response related to some fundamental cultural difference that he described as Strategic

Culture. He contended that there were "dominant behavioral propensities that would

motivate – and constrain – the Soviet leaders."[79] He defined these propensities as:

> "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual
> behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through
> instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy."[80]

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[78] Snyder, "*The Soviet strategic culture: Implications for limited nuclear operations..*" page iii
[79] Ibid. page iii
[80] Ibid. page 8

This definition has intuitive appeal. If you are attempting to understand probable behaviour of any community or society in response to a potential threat, it makes sense to incorporate the influence of shared ideas, responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour. Snyder, however, when he referred to "a national strategic community" was only considering the Soviet leadership, the military and political elite. The sharing of ideas, responses, and habitual behaviour specific to the elite, furthermore, was the result of instruction or imitation. If the shared ideas, responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour derive from instruction and imitation, who or what is the original teacher, the formative model?

In terms of structure, there are four, distinctive, conceptual components to the Snyder definition. The first includes ideas, emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour. Shared ideas, emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour will vary according to the circumstances, composition and purpose of the sharing group or community. The second conceptual component in the definition is that of community. The criteria for membership, the basis for sharing, is not specified in the definition beyond the descriptive qualifiers of national and strategic, so the concept of community, outside of the context described by Snyder, is subject to interpretation. What constitutes a strategic community in a manner that can be applied reliably in a variety of contexts or scenarios?

The third conceptual component in the definition is the shared attribution given to the ideas, responses, and habits held in common by "members of a national strategic community." A basis for sharing, however, is not included in the definition outside of specifying that they relate to the shared threat of limited nuclear war. Why are these

attributes shared? The fourth conceptual component in the Snyder definition is the acquisition process for a community to share values. He attributes acquisition to instruction or imitation. Instruction and imitation are both processes that are context dependent. Instruction implies an instructor or a curriculum for instruction. As such its value is dependent on the instructor. Imitation also will change in response to the values and preferences of who, or what, is to be imitated.

The concept of Strategic Culture, as presented, is neither directly nor indirectly observable on a consistent basis. It offers no means by which the researcher can "gather information that will allow us to judge the presence or absence or magnitude in the real world of the thing to which the concept refers"[81] It refers to Soviet security preferences relative to the threat of nuclear war with the United States, but does mot provide a basis of analysis for understanding comparable security preferences of another society, community, or group.

Monterey Strategic Culture Conference 2005 Analysis

The 2005 Comparative Strategic Culture conference in Monterey, California, considered the "utility and future role for comparative Strategic Culture theory in U.S. defense strategy."[82] At the outset the final report acknowledged that participants had been unable to agree on a definition, but they did produce a series of worthwhile reviews of the literature on the concept that tracked themes, trends, and challenges in Strategic Culture research since its inception. The focus of the conference, however, was very specific to

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[81] Manheim, *Empirical political analysis: Quanitative and qualitative research methods: Seventh edition.* page 22
[82] Stone, "*Comparative strategic culture, conference report..*"

U.S. security concerns following the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11). This produced

a tendency to project Western values and priorities on assessments of the concept. This

narrow approach presented conceptual obstacles to achieving a more universal

appreciation of Strategic Culture as it was heavily coloured by the post 9/11 security

priorities and preferences of the U.S. and their stated objective of finding a predictive

analytic tool specific to these priorities.

The conference acknowledged that distinctive Strategic Cultures would likely be

shaped by a "conglomerate of co-existing variables"[83].

Stone Analysis

Stone arranged the literature on Strategic Culture in three waves with the first

relating to research in the early 1980's. She described this early research as state specific

and explanatory, focusing almost exclusively on the differences between U.S. and Soviet

Strategic Cultures, a natural follow-on from Snyder's introduction and the continued

dominance of the Cold War on strategic policy. While it was agreed that the differences

were the result of "unique variations in macro-environmental variables such as deeply

rooted historical experience, political culture, and geography,"[84] little effort was made to

understand why these variables produced such distinctive and divergent Strategic

Cultures. The reluctance to build toward understanding suggests that the research in the

first wave continued to be more descriptive than explanatory. The reference to geography

in the literature review was not given more than a passing and inclusive notice in a

descriptive list, along with historical experience, and political culture. It is necessary to

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[83] ibid. page 2

[84] Elizabeth Stone, *Comparative Strategic Culture: A Literature Review, Part I,* Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, page 1.

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establish relationships with Strategic Culture in order to move to a theory that has explanatory utility outside of specific contexts.

The second wave of literature saw a shift in research focus from efforts to define the concept to attempts to determine its potential as a reliable predictor of strategic decision making. This is problematic in that there can be no consistent, useful, analytic application of a concept, much less predictive and comparative analytic application, without first establishing a reliable definition. Application of a concept must be preceded by an operational definition, or a "list of instructions that specifies the operations observers are to carry out to experience (measure) the phenomenon referred to by a word or symbol."[85] Without a definition, researchers will have no assurance that they are applying the same concept, that they are researching the same phenomenon.

The second wave of literature also tended to produce long strings of factors without identifying relationships between these factors and Strategic Culture.

"Technology, geography, organizational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, political culture, national character, political psychology, ideology, and even international system structure were all considered relevant inputs into this amorphous Strategic Culture."[86]

The third wave of literature returned the focus of research to the challenge of a definition and was identified by Stone as "more rigorous and eclectic in its conceptualization of ideational independent variables"[87] while focusing narrowly on specific strategic decisions as "dependent variables."[88] This approach presented Snyder's

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85 J. L. Payne, *Foundations of political analysis: Second printing.* (College Station, Texas.: Lytton Publishing Company., 1984.). page 29
86 Johnston, "*Thinking about strategic culture.*" page 37
87 Ibid page 41
88 Ibid page 41

shared values, responses, and behavioural patterns as ideational, independent variables that would impact on, or effect changes in, strategic decisions, presented as dependent variables. In terms of understanding Strategic Culture, I contend that appropriate factors behind the concept are the strategic and biophysical environments. The second wave of literature acknowledged the relevance of geography as one of a cluster of variables, but geography by itself is a very broad term and was not explained in the literature. Instead it was included in a descriptive summary of the factors believed to be relevant to Strategic Culture.

<div align="center">Lantis Analysis</div>

Lantis concentrated on changes in the theoretical context in which definitions for Strategic Culture have developed. He traced the contemporary evolution of the concept from the 1940's notion of national style or national character studies, to the Almond and Verba (1963) introduction of the concept of political culture. There is clearly a relationship here given the use of the word culture as the "total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values and knowledge, which constitute the shared basis of social action."[89]

The 1940's and 1950's witnessed events that tended to place emphasis on reaffirmation of national identity and inter-nation building. The end of WW II; the establishment of the United Nations; the establishment of the ANZUS Security Treaty for the defence of the Pacific between Australia, New Zealand and US; the launch of the European Economic Community; and the USSR and Eastern Bloc nations signing the Warsaw Pact, all represented collaborative, inter-national efforts on the part of multiple

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[89] , in *Collins english dictionary.* (Glasgow, UK.: Harper Collins. , 2005.).

states. The Korean war, the start of the Vitenam war, the partition of India and Pakistan, India becoming a republic, the Suez Canal crisis, and Fidel Castro assuming power in Cuba could all be seen as post-colonial nation-building struggles.

In the 1960s introduction of the concept of political culture coincided with a range of developments: East Germany began to build the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis presented the threat of US–Soviet nuclear war as frighteningly possible, the first US combat troops arrived in Vietnam, war broke out between India and Pakistan, the Six Day War erupted between Israelis and Arabs, and Soviet troops occupied Czechoslovakia. The 1960s, however, was also when politics entered the family living room, with the first televised political debate between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, broadcast across the U.S. and Canada on September 26, 1960. News broadcasts also brought into homes real time events such as the Kennedy assassination, the Vietnam War, civil unrest, and riots. It was a fitting time for political culture to emerge.

Lantis also noted a growing trend in the 1980's to incorporate interdisciplinary research related to Strategic Culture, particulalry anthropology and sociology. He drew on anthropology to define culture, but more importantly turned to sociology to make the connection between culture and state behaviour. He borrowed from sociology the understanding that behaviour can become embedded in a culture. While embedding f behaviour and strategies into a culture may reflect a history of successful application, Lantis makes no reference to a causal agency. He does not indicate what would determine the distinctive behaviour and strategies that would become embedded in any given society, group or community, much less a process by which the behaviour would become embedded.

Lantis noted a resurgence in Strategic Culture interest in the 1990s that once again coincides with world events. He attributes this resurgence to a growing popularity for Constructivism as a theoretical context for understanding state behaviour and international relations. Given that the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, I suggest that this resurgence of interest reflected a need to re-examine power relationships in the politically realigning international community. The distribution of power had gone from the relatively stable bipolar balance of the Cold War to a dynamic, multifaceted, multi-polarity. It was also becoming apparent that developments in the international community were no longer the exclusive determination of states, but reflected the influence of non-state actors such as multinational corporations, non-government agencies, regional economic associations, and international aid agencies.

Lantis portrayed a useful, historical evolution of the concept of Strategic Culture. He also presented an interesting if circular model to explain the relationship between an individual and a society. The individual shapes the society, which in turn shapes the individual. Successful individual preferences and actions become the embedded cultural components that shape the choices of individuals within that society. There is something of the chicken and the egg in this proposition. Which came first? Lantis also acknowledged the existence of tiers of Strategic Culture within a given society, but he made no reference to any means or processes by which the distinctive tiers of Strategic Culture within a given society are shaped or ordered. Sociologists agree that the dominant tier in a society will make strategic choices that will ensure their continued dominance and preserve that status quo. The existing notions of Strategic Culture do not include any

reference to agency or process that will determine the dominant tier in a society or community.

Lantis concluded his literature review of Strategic Culture with his proposed answers to three questions that he felt were critical to understand Strategic Culture. He acknowledged that, of the tiers of Strategic Culture in a given society, it was only the preferences of the elite that had relevance with regards to security choices. He did not indicate, however, how the tiers of Strategic Culture in a society would develop much less how the elite, or security policy-making tier in a given society or community, would be readily identified and sustained.

Lantis also contended that Strategic Culture was subject to change. It becomes problematic, however, to identify what constitutes slow change, or sudden change in response to external shocks, when it is not clear what shaped the Strategic Culture in the first place.

Lantis also addressed the question of universality of Strategic Culture but could provide no clear answer. There is no reference to a consistent process, or factor, that influences the shared values, responses, and behaviour patterns of any society or community and subsequently shapes unique security preferences.

Howlett Analysis

The Howlett literature review was, for the purposes of this thesis, the most insightful. At the outset he placed the review beyond a traditional realist perspective to a transformed twenty-first century understanding of the world and the changed nature of conflict. Howlett contended that Strategic Culture research was better served by a

theoretical context that could accommodate the expanding range of non-state actors influencing international relations.

Howlett also distinguished between theorists who were content to apply the concept of Strategic Culture before establishing a concise definition and those who were more concerned with the development of an understanding of the concept. Beyond making this distinction, however, Howlett was not able to foresee success in the second endeavour. His suggestion of a compromise "to establish a middle range theoretical and policy range knowledge"[90] is problematic as a solution. Whatever theoretical approach is used to further understanding, there first has to be a reasonable degree of conceptual consensus. Without agreement on a reliable definition, theorists may find themselves arguing apples and oranges. Without first establishing consensus on a definition, collaboration within one academic discipline, much less across the range of conceptual and discipline boundaries, would be almost impossible. Without a core definition it would be difficult to identify, and understand Howletts' "conditions, processes, and causal mechanisms that link outcome."[91]

Howlett identified three dominant aspects of the literature on Strategic Culture. The traditional state centric approach to research was seen to reinforce or enhance the status quo or the power of the political elite in a society. Howlett contended that the approach had less to do with pursuit of accurate and measurable analysis than it did with rationalisation or justification for state centric strategic choices. Defining Strategic

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[90] Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature..*" page 1
[91] Ibid. page 2

Culture solely in state centric terms fails to reflect the involvement of a growing range of non-state actors in 21st century international relations security analysis.

The second trend, was promising in that it recognized the need to establish a relationship between an independent and dependent variable or variables. Strategic Culture was identified as the independent variable and actor behaviour as a subsequent dependent variable. The third trend was to become immersed in and analyze the cultural experience of actors in order to understand their choices. This approach fails to place what an actor says or does not say in a context for comparative analysis.

These points are not to dispute the relevance of the trends identified by Howlett but to point out that they bring us no closer to a definition.

What are the shared values that would shape a common identity, a common preference among otherwise distinctive state and non-state stakeholders specific to a region, or to shared common values, with regards to security choices and priorities? Without a reliable definition the identification of shared values is dependent on context specific description as opposed to an understanding of the underlying causal agency or process, the independent variable, or range of variables, which would result in a distinctive, collective, regionally or transnationally defined, phenomenon.

Howlett considered the impact of the internet as a significant, emerging influence. He recognized that that the internet was producing a decentralized, grass roots network that was challenging the traditional dominance of the state-centric power model for international security, and changing the nature of conflict. Virtual communities can transcend borders, economic and social classes, and racial or age related demographics. They can be short lived, dedicated to achieving a specific and time sensitive shared

objective as was the case following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. CBC news, for example, provided the basis for a temporary virtual community by maintaining a directory of internet resources and a blog, available to victims of the hurricane, to track down missing relatives and friends, to access shelter and even just to share images and experiences.[92] Amnesty International, on the other hand, founded in 1961 by British lawyer Peter Benenson,[93] has grown into a global, virtual community of over three million people who claim a shared commitment to justice and freedom, and who advocate collaboratively on behalf of specific human rights issues. In both examples, the internet has provided a venue by which a diverse community of people, not necessarily associated by shared, national, social, or economic, identity, can work collectively to achieve specific, shared objectives, and to influence social, political or economic change.

Howlett identified geography as key to shaping Strategic Culture as well as climate and resources. Included in geography in his review was proximity to great powers, access to vital resources, and the nature and number of a state's territorial borders. All were recognized as significant geographic factors, relevant to strategic considerations.

> "the significance of geography, climate, and resources has been a key element in strategic thinking throughout the millennia and remain important sources of Strategic Culture in the current era."[94]

These physical, environmental factors are also slow to change. Acknowledging the importance of geography as a key influence on Strategic Culture is an important step towards understanding but it does not go far enough. The physical

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[92] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "In Depth Hurrican Katrina: Internet Resources," Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/katrina/links.html
[93] Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Canada," Amnesty International Canada, http://www.amnesty.ca/about/index.php
[94] Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature..*" page 4

environment sets the conditions for, and therefore shapes core social, political, and economic values and priorities, as well as culturally embedded myths and symbols. [95] Phenomena such as geography, weather, and strategic relations are not static, but will change and evolve, albeit slowly,

<div align="center">Strategic Culture - Common Themes and Concepts</div>

The concepts or ideas used most consistently in previous research on Strategic Culture have a place in the development of an improved definition. An exploration of common concepts in previous definitions as well as the aims of researchers will facilitate developing a definition in this thesis. There has also been some agreement among researchers on some of the key challenges that have confounded definitional consensus. A sampling of existing ideas will provide a reasonable indication of the concepts consistently used in previous definitions of Strategic Culture and the factors assumed to influence it.

<div align="center">Sampling Definitions</div>

Existing definitions of Strategic Culture have varied somewhat. Some have been context specific, as in the cases of Jack Snyder's definition to support his research on anticipated Soviet policy responses to U.S. nuclear policy, and Andrew Scobells' on Chinese security policy. Others, like Jeffrey Lantis and Colin Gray were concerned with establishing a more universally applicable definition that would support further research and application. In spite of differing research objectives, there are similarities in the

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definitions of Strategic Culture and its origins.As noted above, Snyderdefined the concept as:

> "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy."[96]

He referred to ideas, responses, and patterns of behaviour, attributed to instruction or imitation, which he credited with shaping strategic doctrine. His proposed definition was context specific in that he used it to predict the probable military behaviour of one state in response to a specific security scenario presented by the nuclear policy of another. It is not clear Snyder established a frame of reference that would allow researchers to consistently identify the same concept as manifested in other cultures.

As noted above, Snyders' definition of the concept had intuitive appeal For responses to become identifiable patterns of behaviour, however, they have to become ingrained or imbedded. The use of the term culture implies deep and embedded origins, according to one definition - "the total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values and knowledge, which constitute the shared bases of social action (and) the total range of activites and ideas of a people."[97] Where do the ideas, responses, and patterns of behaviour come from?

Snyder also dismissed the impact of any active Strategic Culture held by the bulk of the Soviet population. He felt that the majority of the population had little to no influence on strategic policy and so dismissed such preferences in most of the Soviet population. He concluded, instead, that the only relevant Soviet Strategic Culture was that held by a

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[96] Snyder, "*The Soviet strategic culture: Implications for limited nuclear operations.*."page 15
[97] Ibid. page 15

militaristic Soviet elite. He did not however identify the origins for the ideas, responses, and patterns of behaviour unique to the Soviet elite that would inform and shape security doctrine. There was reference to history, but it was a reference confined to Soviet history. The Soviet Union was a state populated predominantly by Russians, a people with a deep history that stretches back centuries. The patterns Snyder noted in the Soviets had social and political origins that long predated the establishment of the Soviet state. He would have been better served in his analysis if he had looked deeper than Soviet history.

Snyder acknowledged his analysis was tentative because of a shortage of case studies and historical examples of Soviet crises similar in intensity to a possible nuclear war. There is validity in looking to the shared ideas, responses, and patterns of behaviour of a group of people to achieve a better understanding of probable strategic responses. Shared ideas, responses, and patterns of behaviour come from somewhere; they are in this sense dependent variables.

As noted above, Colin Gray first defined Strategic Culture as:

"modes of thought and action with respect to [force], derived from perception of national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization, and from state-distinctive experiences." [98]

Gray revisited the concept in a 1984 paper entitled 'Comparative Strategic Culture' [99] and offered a further development of the concept, presenting Strategic Culture as some kind of evolution of political culture. He might have brought research closer to an acceptable conceptual definition if he had taken this insight into a revised definition. Instead there remained the same outstanding problems in defining the concept.

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[98] C. Gray, "*National style in strategy: The American example.*," *International Security.* Vol. 6., no. No. 2. (1981.). Page 22
[99] Gray, "*Comparative strategic culture..*"

Gray, when describing Strategic Culture as an extension of political culture, suggested that "a particular culture should encourage a particular style in thought and action" but that, like geopolitical conditions, strategic-cultural factors should be understood to influence rather than rigidly predetermine state behaviour. Noteworthy in his 1984 observations are both the proposition that the concept had limited predictive capability and the connection he made between culture and geography.

Grays' approach to the concept in the eighties was also very much state centric and focused on how Strategic Culture might influence the state's use of force. His reference to modes of thought and action with respect to the use of that force, however, used concepts similar to Snyder's – ideas, responses, and patterns of behaviour. It remains unclear, however, what modes of thought and action, what ideas, responses and patterns of behaviour, common to most security stakeholders, will consistently influence security choices and the development of security policy. Gray suggests its origins lie in national perceptions of historical experience, a national drive to self-characterization and state experience. But what perceptions and which experiences are most relevant are not specified. What are the conceptual bases or sources of "historical experience"? What drives a people to a particular self-characterization? What shapes the core values and priorities of an evolving state experience?

Like Snyder, Gray did not see the concept having precise predictive value with regards to state behaviour but saw it instead as an influencing factor.

Alastair Iain Johnston, in 1995, defined Strategic Culture as:

"different predominant strategic preferences rooted in early formative experiences of state, influenced to some degree by philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of state and its elites."[100]

Johnston referred to "predominant strategic preferences" that he attributed to the early formative experiences of a state. He acknowledged a limited influence on those preferences by philosophical, political, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites. There are, once again, similarities with previous research in terms of the concepts used to define Strategic Culture and its antecedents. There is a conceptual consistency, whether you are referring to ideas, responses, and patterns of behaviour; modes of thought and action; or, predominant strategic preferences. Each grouping of concepts suggests collective or shared strategic response preferences, usually attributed to a state or the dominant elite of a state. Johnston took the concept of Strategic Culture further than a general reference to historical influences, however, and based his notion of predominant strategic preferences on formative state experience. There is no indication, however, of what first shaped those formative state experiences. How can a researcher relate them in comparative analysis to the formative experiences of another state? What factors, common to most states, communities, or societies, would give rise to the formation of shared experiences that would shape security choices, and the development of strategic policy? Johnston described the attributes of Strategic Culture, but he did not suggest how or why the concept might exist as a phenomenon common to state and non-state stakeholders, and how it could therefore, be applied in comparative analysis. What are the elements that can consistently influence security perceptions so as to shape the

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[100] Johnston, "*Thinking about strategic culture*." page 4

ideas, responses, and patterns of behaviour; modes of thought and action; and, predominant strategic preferences?

Andrew Scobell wrote a 1998 paper on the Strategic Culture of China [need citation], republished as a book in 2004, in which he defined Strategic Culture as:

> "the fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and military elites in a country. These assumptions will vary from country to country...Also important are the perceptions prevalent among the elite within one country regarding the nature of another country's Strategic Culture."[101]

Scobell set out to use the concept of Strategic Culture in the specific, and state-centric, context of assessing the strategic disposition of China relative to the U.S. and Japan. He first conducted an analysis of the Chinese Strategic Culture and then attempted an analysis of their perception of the distinct Strategic Cultures of Japan and the U.S. This undertaking amounted to comparative Strategic Culture analysis. Though nearly as tentative as Snyders' efforts to explain the Soviet Strategic Culture, Scobell made a useful reference to what he described as a long-standing Chinese appreciation for the relevance of culture in strategic thinking. The point was well-illustrated by a quote he cited from Lieutenant General Li Jijun, former vice president of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, who stated that:

> "Culture is the root and foundation of strategy. Strategic thinking, in the process of its evolutionary history, flows into the mainstream of a country or a nation's culture. Each country or nation's Strategic Culture cannot but bear the imprint of cultural traditions, which in a subconscious and complex way, prescribes and defines strategy making."[102]

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[101] A. Scobell, *China and strategic culture.* (Honolulu, Hawaii,U.S.A.: University Press of the Pacific., 2004.). page 2
[102] Ibid. page 1

Scobell highlighted what he had observed as a Chinese "Cult of the Defense" that he felt played an important part in the development of their security policy. He stated at the Monterey Conference that the "Chinese elites fervently believe that China is under the sway of a unique peace-loving, non-expansionist, defensive-minded strategic tradition."[103] He did not say why this Cult of Defense existed, beyond referencing ideological and philosophical factors and the perceptions and policies of the military and political elite. Scobell made no connection between Chinese philosophies or ideologies and assumptions about the role of war or any aggregate of conceptual elements that had a unique societal and political impact on China. There is reference to the benefit of thousands of years of history through which behavioural patterns develop and become apparent, but there is no clear link between what amounts to traditional ideas and values and fundamental sources for those ideas and values. It is as though the ideas simply manifested out of nowhere. What is so unique about China that it has evolved what Scobell believes is such a distinctive set of philosophical ideals, values, and priorities? What factors or characteristics have persisted throughout history to shape these "fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war"?

Lantis, in discussions at the 2005 Monterey Conference, identified culture as "an evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions."[104] On the subject of the permanence or malleability of the phenomenon, he noted that "Strategic Culture possessed a strong degree of continuity, and highlighted that more often than not past learning becomes sedimented into the collective consciousness

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[103] Stone, "*Comparative strategic culture, conference report.*."page 8
[104] ibid. page 11

of a population or group."[105] But, while acknowledging that Strategic Culture was both evolving and embedded in a society, he did not indicate the origins for this evolution of shared meaning. He also neglected to indicate how this shared meaning would become sedimented into collective consciousness.

Lantis' reference to a "system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions"[106] is not dissimilar to earlier definitions that refer to modes of thought and action, ideas, responses, patterns of behaviour, preferences, assumptions and philosophical, political, and cognitive characteristics.

While the 2005 Monterey conference agreed there that the concept of Strategic Culture still eluded consensus definition, several of the participants in that conference also took part in the 2006 Curriculum project where they were able to arrive at a working definition that they felt was adequate as a basis for developing a curriculum to support further research. Their definition, noted above, reflected preceding efforts and represented the most comprehensive attempt at definition.

That definition captured the notion found in most previous definitions that Strategic Culture was made up of shared ideas and actions. It also supported the frequently held understanding that these shared attributes came from common experience and cultural history.

This 2006 definition comes close to providing a basis for consistent application in comparative analysis, but the Curriculum Project did not provide an agreed set of variables that can account for the shared ideation and action. Shared beliefs, assumptions,

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[105] ibid. page 11
[106] Ibid. page 11

and modes of behaviour presumably derive from common experiences and accepted narratives. But what factors determine and explain those common experiences? What are the measurable and enduring conditions that shape and perpetuate accepted, and often distinctive, shared narratives? One missing element is the relationship a people have with their strategic and biophysical environment, with their geography. Their natural resources, topography, climate, and strategic position relative to competing societies ultimately influence how a people chooses to organize and order themselves in an adaptive social construct. These are the persistent elements that make up the dominant strategic and biophysical environment for a culture or society and as such will inform and shape their priorities and define their core values. The strategic and biophysical environment, and a people's capacity to harness or control that environment to their best advantage, will determine how they identify threat and opportunity and the means they choose to construct shared, collective, security objectives.

It is interesting to present the waves of research on Strategic Culture in a table (ref. Appendix 1) to make for easier tracking of trends and patterns. In terms of language used, military is referenced 29 times in the definitions reviewed for this thesis compared to seven references to geography and 15, collectively, to history and historical. There are 14 references to war, seven to power, 18 to political, and only seven to society or social. These patterns would tend to indicate a preference on the part of researchers to focus on understanding Strategic Culture from a state centric and militarist perspective. Beyond of the often-similar definitions that have accumulated in research on Strategic Culture, there has also been some consistency in research trends, and challenges. It is worthwhile to review and compare the research trends and challenges chronologically in a table (ref.

Annex 2) to get a better appreciation of both the trends in research and the focus areas

that have drawn the greatest interest. If you convert the table of trends and challenges

according to areas of research focus (Appendix 2) to a pie chart (ref Figure 1) you find

that forty percent of researchers are focusing on identifying the nature of Strategic

Culture. The dominant research priority is on establishing what the concept is, as opposed

to why it exists, or where it originates. Process and source only account, collectively, for

eighteen percent of dominant trends and challenges in Strategic Culture research.

1.	Application 8%
2.	Approach 15%
3.	Cross Discipline 8%
4.	Definition 10%
5.	Internet 3%
6.	Nature 40%
7.	Process 3%
8.	Source 15%

Figure 1 Strategic Culture Trends and Challenges Distribution

The next chapter will explore the relevance of other disciplines in better

understanding Strategic Culture.

Payne (1984) contends that an operational definition provides "a list of instructions

that specifies the operations observers are to carry out to experience (measure) the

phenomenon referred to by a word or symbol."[i]

The acknowledgment that geography has a significant influence on culturally

distinctive security and war fighting preferences brings the researcher no closer to

knowing "the operations observers are to carry out to experience (measure) the phenomenon referred to by a word or symbol."[107]

Without a reliable definition, researchers cannot be assured that they are "looking at or measuring the same phenomenon for the same word."[108]

The understanding of Strategic Culture developed here is based on the contention that the strategic and biophysical environments are key, as factors or independent variables, to understanding the concept. In short, aspects of geography and sociology, or the relationships between the physical environment and the organization and ordering of distinctive human societies, are key to a better understanding and analytic application of the concept of Strategic Culture.

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[107] Payne, *Foundations of political analysis: Second printing.* page 29
[108] Ibid. page 29

Chapter Three   Exploring Other Disciplines

Geography and Sociology

The notion that the strategic and biophysical environment contributes to the shaping of human behaviour and the ordering and organizing of regionally distinctive social constructs is not a new one. Sir Halford J. Mackinder, in 1904, published his article, 'The Geographical Pivot of History' [109] in which he proposed that geography was key to the shaping of human history. Mackinder wrote from a British perspective, at a time when the age of exploration and colonization had come to an end, and there were no perceptible new lands to discover. He observed that human knowledge, at the start of the twentieth century, was sufficiently developed to offer an understanding of the world in its totality. Researchers could finally "seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical causation in universal human history."[110] He believed that such a formula would provide insights and perspective on the conduct of competing forces in international politics. In his article he described the physical features of the world that he felt had most influenced human action and related them to the phases of human history to which they were, in effect, organically linked. Oceans could both limit and facilitate transportation and communication. Mountain ranges provided natural borders and strongholds, and open plains and navigable rivers could provide natural highways. He saw the ebb and flow of human history as a dynamic part of the life of the world as a living organism.

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[109]H.J. Mackinder, "*The geographical pivot of history.*," *The Geographical Journal.* Vol. 170., no. No. 4. (1904.).
[110] Ibid. page 299

More recently Colin Gray, (1996), in his article, 'The Continued Primacy of Geography - A Debate on Geopolitics'[111] pointed out the significance of geography in shaping culture as it related to the development of security policy. His claim was not that geography determined policy but that it was "pervasive in world politics." Geography, he argued, defined not only the players in international politics but also the stakes for which they competed and the terms in which they measure security. In 1999 he was still more explicit in describing the relationship between geography and security preferences

> Ideas about war and strategy are influenced by physical and political geography-some Strategic Cultures plainly have, for example, a maritime or a continentalist tilt-by political or religious ideology, and by familiarity with, and preference for, particular military technologies. Strategic Culture is the world of mind, feeling, and *habit in behaviour.*[112]

Is it enough, however, to posit the existence of a relationship between the physical and strategic environment and aspects of culture that influence security choices? There are no criteria or analytic processes introduced that would distinguish either the relevant aspects of geography or the type of values, responses and habits of behaviour that might result in response to various aspects of geography.

Gray did go so far as to describe the distinction between a maritime power and a continental power.

> "in modern times maritime powers and coalitions have either won or drawn all the great wars they have waged with continental powers and coalitions. Thus, in what British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder called the Columbian Age of 1500-1900, maritime powers apparently enjoyed a strategic advantage in their struggles with continental powers." [113]

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[111] C. Gray, "*The continued primacy of geography.*," *Orbis; Spring 96.* Vol. 40., no. Issue 2. (1996.).

[112] Gray, C. S. (1999). "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back." Review of International Studies Vol. 25(No. 1): 49-69. Page 58

[113] Gray, "*The continued primacy of geography..*"page 2

This argument however, is merely a description of the noted historical strategic advantage of sea power over continental power, and offers no basis for understanding why a society would develop one strategic capability over another, much less why it was particularly successful. There is an acknowledged relationship between geography and the development of a robust maritime capability, but there is no indication of a process that specifies the aspects of the relationship between geography and culture relevant to security preferences.

The influence of geography on human societies is much older than the power struggle between maritime and continental societies, however, and shapes far more than the conduct of inter-societal competition and conflict. Research in Strategic Culture has made increasing but indeterminate, descriptive, reference to the relevance of geography, but has yet to explain, how and why or how it is relevant. This makes it difficult to understand a particular Strategic Culture, much less apply the concept in effective comparative analysis between two distinct social constructs. What aspects of geography influence distinctive shared values, responses, and patterns of behaviour from one society or community to another?

Anthropologists and sociologists agree that geography is an integral part of what shapes the fundamental core values and priorities and the social, political, economic, and military organization of a society. What follows is a review of a few key, historical, and geographically influenced factors, as presented by sociologists Patrick Nolan and

Gerhard Lenski (2006),[114] that are relevant to understanding Strategic Culture as proposed in this thesis. The review includes the Nolan and Lenski description human societies as adaptive, and politically autonomous, groups whose members engage in cooperative activities.[115]

Figure 2 Evolutionary-Ecological Taxonomy of Societies [116]
This chart illustrates how the subsistence Technology and the Environment of a society come together to produce an evolving Ecological-Evolutionary Typology or EET. The environment determines the most appropriate subsistence technology in an evolving process.

Ecological-Evolutionary Typology theory (EET) (Figure 2) guides much of the current study of human societies.[117] The three key assumptions of this theory are relevant to the use of geography in clarifying the concept of Strategic Culture.

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[114] G. Lenski, P. Nolan., *Human societies: An introduction to macrosociology - tenth edition.* (Boulder, Colorado, U.S.A.: Paradigm Publishers., 2006.).
[115] Ibid.
[116] http://www.unc.edu/~nielsen/soci111/m8/soci111m8.pdf

The first assumption of the EET is that human societies are a part of the natural world and therefore influenced by their environment. The second assumption is that, because they are a part of the world of nature, members of human societies, like other species, have a genetic heritage that profoundly influences their choices and actions through the genetic embedding of historically successful social adaptations. (Figure 3) The third assumption of EET is that this genetic heritage enables members of human societies to create distinctive cultural heritages through proactive dissemination of successful ideas and behaviour.

A cumulative cultural heritage is made possible by the uniquely human capacity for complex written, symbolic, and oral means of communicating. It is this characteristic that sets human societies apart from all others in the world of nature.

Nolan and Lenski define the environment as everything that is external to a population and has any effect on it.[118] In terms of human society, this goes beyond the material or biophysical elements such as soil, mineral, and water resources, terrain, climate, plants, animals and physical features of their immediate surroundings. The environment, for human societies, includes the strategic environment, the human, social element, "or any other human societies with which its members are likely to come in contact, or which could influence the society in any way." [119]

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[117] Lenski, *Human societies: An introduction to macrosociology - tenth edition.* page 20
[118] Ibid. page 10

[119] Ibid. page 10

The strategic and biophysical environments both present opportunities and threats related to perceived security. The genetic heritage of human societies is the historically embedded lessons learned that serve as the basis for the culturally perpetuated preferences or cultural heritage in social ordering and organizing that enables a society to make the most of the opportunities unique to their environment and overcome the challenges. This heritage is a genetically embedded, collective, historical experience of what has been successful for a particular human society in the past, both in terms of technology, social, political, spiritual, and economic organization.

The unique human capacity to create distinctive and complex cultural heritages as an extension on the more primal genetic heritage is made possible by the ability to share complex information through the use of symbols. Symbols are distinct from the signals used by non-human societies, in that they are "conveyors of information whose form and meaning have developed within a community of users."[120] Language allows human societies to incrementally create and perpetuate complex cultural heritages of values, preferences, and patterns of behaviour that have proven successful within the context of their specific environment.

Nolan and Lenski also support a basic model for human societies on which it is possible to build alternative models shaped by different environmental factors. This model includes the most basic determinants or causes that shape human societies. (Figure 3) Nolan and Lenski include the influence of the strategic, social, and biophysical

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[120] Ibid. page 15

environment, the influence of genetic heritage, and the influence of culturally perpetuated

prior social and cultural characteristics unique to a society.

Figure 3 Basic Ecological-evolutionary theory model [121]
This model shows the basic ecological-evolutionary determinants of the characteristics of human societies.

Human beings form societies in a collective response to a variety of shared basic

needs. These include the obvious physical survival requirements of food, water, sleep,

warmth, and oxygen. Societies also develop shared explanations, or "durable answers,"[122]

for the unknown, a life philosophy that is specific to their strategic environment and

forms the basis for their social institutions, including their ideological and spiritual

organization, priorities, and values.

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[121] Ibid. page 18
[122] Ibid. page 41

Finally, there is a shared need to be a part of a society. The human infant is helpless for an extended period of time and must be protected and nurtured. Survival of the individual and the society, furthermore, is dependent on the ability of the child to acquire a great deal of information that will guide behaviour and develop subsistence technology skills that will eventually allow the child to participate in the society as a contributing adult. The child acquires this information and knowledge through an extended, and sometimes formalized, socialization process.

Societies have developed in a variety of strategic and biophysical environments that have presented challenges and opportunities fundamental to shaping geographically distinguishable social constructs. Humankind is a marvellously adaptive species with the advantage of incremental species and societal learning. This unique combination of the adaptive and the learned has enabled human societies to develop and advance the necessary skills, and tools or subsistence technologies, or the "technology used by the members of a society to obtain the basic necessities of life,"[123] best suited to their environment, to ensure not only their survival, but also their growth and further development. The result has been a variety of distinctive societal types that have emerged throughout human history.

Sociologists have developed a classification system[124] for the historical development of human societies based on the subsistence technologies employed. The technological means of subsistence were traditionally shaped directly by geographical

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[123] Ibid. page 361

[124] Ibid. page 62

factors such as strategic location, available natural resources, and predominating climate. This system of classification divides human societies into ten basic categories ( ), with individual societies classified on the basis of their primary subsistence technology or mode of subsistence. Of these ten categories, four , were identified as being based on environmentally specialized technologies (EST):advanced agrarian societies, fishing societies, simple herding societies and advanced herding societies.

EST based societies often came to survive as absorbed components of larger more complex societies. In isolation they were too specialized and lacked the diversity to sustain growth.

Examples of some of these categories no longer exist today, beyond the possibility of isolated exceptions, and the core values and priorities of hunter gatherer, or simple horticultural, societies have limited significance in an analysis of twenty-first century international relations. Advanced agrarian societies; environmentally specialized societies such as fishing, maritime, and herding; and, industrial societies, however, continue to be represented, and their characteristics can directly or indirectly, influence stakeholder preferences and choices in today's global society.

All of these societal types evolved out of and continue to be influenced by the opportunities and challenges presented by their geography. A society needs arable land to support agriculture, rivers, oceans and lakes to support fishing or maritime subsistence, open plains for grazing to support herding, and the financial and transportation infrastructure, material, and qualified human resources, to support the development of industrial society.

The subsistence technologies specific to each of these distinct environments have also influenced the social, spiritual, political and economic organization, ordering, and priorities, or core values of their respective societies. Even as a society moves forward to embrace industrialization, its core values and priorities may continue to have deep and influential roots in their original strategic and biophysical environment and in the values and priorities of the subsistence technology on which their modern society is based. Key among the persistent or embedded core values is the power stratification within a society. This can include the identification of legitimate political authority, social, economic and political values and organization, and the fundamental principles of religion. (Nolan and Lenski 2006) [125] This embedded identification of legitimate authority, which includes the legitimate transfer of authority, is one of the core values, relevant to understanding Strategic Culture, and can persist into industrialization and the development of a modern society or community. It can often include the perpetuation of historical stratification, or a traditional power hierarchy within a society that has no obvious utility in an industrialized community but derives, instead, from the productivity demands of a much earlier subsistence technology.

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[125] Ibid. page 41

Societal Classifications	
1. Hunting and gathering societies:	the hunting of wild animals and foraging for uncultivated plants
2. Simple horticultural societies:	cultivate plants but do not have plows and use only wood and stone tools
3. Advanced horticultural societies:	use metal tools and weapons
4 Simple agrarian societies:	cultivate plants and use plows but use only copper and bronze
5. Advanced agrarian societies:	use iron tools and weapons
6. Fishing societies:	environmentally specialized type (EST) - relies on that technology most useful to people located on a body of water
7. Maritime societies:	(EST) more technological advanced than fishing societies
8. Simple herding societies:	(EST) subsist on open grasslands with sparse rainfall
9. Advanced herding societies:	(EST) uses horses and camels for transportation in work and warfare
10. Industrial societies:	newest type and most advanced; heavy dependence on machine technology and inanimate sources of energy Also the most powerful

Table 1 Societal Classifications [126]

There is no need in this thesis to attempt to capture the full range of human social development and the classifications of societies that have long since faded in to history or are so underrepresented today as to have little relevance beyond novelty. It is important, however, to look briefly at a few of the more prevalent societal classifications in order to better understand how their environmentally distinguished social, political, and economic, organizational and hierarchical preferences can continue to influence shared core values, responses, and patterns of behaviour of stakeholders in international relations today.

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[126] Ibid. page 62

Advanced Agrarian Societies

Advanced agrarian societies first appeared around 800 BC when iron came into use for the production of general tools. This type of society traditionally saw the bulk of the land owned by the governing elite which made up a very small percentage of the population. In many instances, the landowners also owned the peasants who lived on and worked the land. The Czar in Russia 'owned' over 27 million serfs just prior to their emancipation in 1861. Living conditions for peasants were generally very poor.

Less than ten percent of the population in an advanced agrarian society actually lived in the urban centres. Much of this percent was the society's elite. This governing elite also generally regarded work of any kind as degrading and socially beneath them. As the dominant class in the advanced agrarian society, their values became the model, the ideal for the rest of the society. So much so, that those merchants in their societies, who acquired adequate wealth often abandoned their successful enterprises to pursue the coveted life of leisure enjoyed by the governing, land owning, elite. Nolan and Lenski note that some sociologists contend that this attitude towards the value of work may have contributed to a deteriorating rate of technological innovation that eventually came to compromise advanced agrarian societies.

Governance for advanced agrarian societies was predominantly hereditary monarchy, and authority over the bulk of the population tended to be coercive. Intra-societal conflict was generally interclass. Interstate conflict was frequent and tended to be between the elites of the warring states with the bulk of the populations coerced into reluctant participation as combatants on behalf of their respective monarch. Political power was sought after for the personal advantages it would bring, not for the benefit of

the bulk of the population. This is described by Nolan and Lenski as, "the proprietary theory of the state,"[127] and portrays the state as a piece of property that its owners, the governing, land owning elite, may use as they see fit. Land-ownership, furthermore, tended to be inherited, creating an entrenched ruling elite that represented a relatively small segment of the overall population, with the majority of a society excluded from participation beyond providing a cheap, renewable, labour resource. Interstate as well as intrastate conflict was based on competition among governing elites for ownership or control of land.

This type of societal attitude is often reflected in the elitist approach to governance experienced in some countries today where the ruling minority is made up of the military and the state leaders or owners of industry. It arguably describes the dominant attitude of government in modern Russia, for example, and was also a strong influence in the governance of the Soviet Union. Jack Snyder's report reflected this historical attitude. It was clear to him that this narrow segment of Soviet society believed the larger strategic subculture lacked the bureaucratic or political strength to have a voice in Soviet policy. In short, the bulk of the population was not relevant to governance except as a malleable human resource best suited to fill the ranks of the military and industry.

Simple Herding Societies

Herding societies, especially simple herding societies, are scarce today. They are relevant, however, to understanding and applying Strategic Culture in analysis today as they are the historical origins, the source as it were, of the embedded core values and

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[127]Ibid. page 160

power associations that underlie the security preferences of many modern stakeholders in the Middle East and Central Asia.

According to Nolan and Lenski herding societies, like fishing societies, adapted to a specialized environment. They had approximately the same range and extent of technological development as horticultural and agrarian societies. The domestication of animals appeared in human societies about the same time that plants were first cultivated. Crop cultivation was not well suited, however, to areas with limited rainfall, a shorter growing season, or mountainous terrain. Livestock, however, could thrive in many of these areas. Herding societies and their pastoral economies typically required a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle in order to follow their grazing animals. Ownership of livestock and control of the human resources to tend and protect herds or flocks held greater value than ownership of land. Land was something you did not own, but instead used until it was exhausted, and then you moved on. Simple herding societies were generally made up of multiple smaller communities, similar in size to traditional hunter gatherer societies. This was attributed to dependence on sparse resources and the need for mobility. The size of herder societies, usually made up of about a dozen distinct communities each of less than a hundred in population, was dependent, in part on the specifics of their environment. Open grasslands presented few natural barriers to movement or political expansion.

Advanced Herding Societies

Advanced herding societies began using horses and camels for transportation around 2000 B.C. giving them a military advantage and furthering their capacity for political expansion. Livestock was the primary resource for these societies and the size of

a herd signified not just a man's wealth but also his power. It took a strong man or the head of a large family to maintain and defend a large herd, and its attendant human population, against rivals and enemies.

These societies were distinguished by a high degree of social inequality and the practice of hereditary slavery. Men performed the work that supported the economy. Raiding and warfare were also a frequent occurrence, making pastoral life both patriarchal and highly militant. The size of the herder societies, coupled with their militancy, led to the necessary development of a strong political authority. For about 2500 years, commencing around 900 B.C., herding societies successfully preyed on agrarian societies from China to Europe. Advanced herding societies formed some of the largest empires in history, with that of the Mongols, established in the early thirteenth century by Genghis Khan, one of the most notable examples. Ultimately, however, the herders could not maintain dominance over the advanced agrarian societies. Herding as a subsistence technology could not produce the same reliable surplus produced by agrarian societies. It is this capacity to produce surplus that was essential to advances in subsistence technology. Surplus enabled a society to support specialization and the development of increased societal complexity.

Industrial Societies

Industrial societies are dominant in twenty-first century international relations. Nolan and Lenski identify industrial societies as the most recent in the human timeline of social development and suggest there is an ongoing theoretical debate over whether or not the industrial age has come to a conclusion. The countering view is that it has been replaced by the information age.

According to Nolan and Lenski, industrialization began in agrarian societies long before the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century. A variety of factors gradually moved agrarian societies forward towards industrialization. The first was the accumulation of technological information, including advances in transportation and navigation, ultimately enabling the successful conquest and colonization of the New World. The technological innovations that expanded horizons for agrarian societies included the compass, the stern rudder, larger ships and a reconfiguration of sails from few large ones to multiple, more manageable small sails.

The conquest of the New World was begun in the fifteenth century, long before the formal onset of the Industrial Revolution. This conquest introduced new money into the European economy in the form of Inca and Aztec gold and significantly weakened the long established and agrarian based barter system. Colonization and the increased volume and relevance of money also triggered inflation, which decreased the power of the traditional land owning, governing elite. At the same time it gave the merchant class unprecedented power and authority in government. A greater and more equitable distribution of prosperity and power increased support for further technological innovation and the continued improvement in civic and industrial efficiency. This era also saw a shift in the world power centre from the Middle East to Western Europe.

There were several other innovations that moved human societies out of the agrarian societal model. The printing press led to a rise in literacy. There were also improvements in agriculture that increased productivity. This was partially in response to the move towards a more capitalistic society less resistant to change and an increase in agricultural competition triggered by inflation.

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There are several key features that distinguished an industrial society. There was a shift in population concentration to urban centres closer to the means of production. A marked increase in productivity saw a corresponding increase in overall living standards. The nature of production also changed, shifting from labor intensive to capital intensive. The labor force also changed. Among the changes was an increase in administrative or white collar jobs, increased employment of women outside the home, larger work organizations, and an increase in specialization.

Industrial societies were larger in terms of population, infrastructure and diversity of land use, and more complex than any preceding societal type. The stratification of society increased in number and diversity. Government, as a result, played an increasing role in regulating society and managing its economic life. A larger share of the gross national product, in the form of increased taxes, was required to support the larger and more complex government. People in an industrialized society, through participation in assembly line production, also began to become increasingly alienated from the products of their labor. Their sense of worth, particularly with the introduction of hourly wages, became more readily measureable by their ability to consume.

Traditional kinship and community subgroup relationships also experienced realignment though industrialization, with large mechanized workplaces becoming a new basis for kinship associations. The participation of women in the workplace also changed the traditional family model and began to relieve women from exclusive dependence on male family members.

The locus of power for industrial societies shifted from land ownership to ownership of the means of production. Included in this was an imperative to ensure

unobstructed access to both the resources needed for production, and to expanding

markets for their products. The governing elite of industrial societies held a view of the

bulk of the population similar to that of a maritime society in that they needed a diversely

skilled and educated population to work the factories and administer the day to day

running of the larger and more complex society.

Industrial societies are the most powerful in today's international community of

societies. They control the global economy and oblige a high degree of emulation by

developing countries hoping for successful participation in world markets. It is

noteworthy to consider the potential impact this pressure has on societies with deep ties

to their traditional values and priorities, and their perceptions of what constitutes

legitimate power. Some societies may come from historical backgrounds that make them

less inclined to embrace change. In extreme cases the imposition of change can represent

a serious threat to their traditionally held ideational values and their understanding of

power in and of itself.

<center>Additional Geographical Influences</center>

The above is merely a thumbnail review of a few key society types that have

developed as a result of the influence of geography on social, economic and political

priorities and values. There are other aspects of geography that have played and continue

to play a part in shaping not only the development of human societies but also their

security preferences. According to Nolan and Lenski (2006) geographical elements that

influence the diffusion or spread of innovative societal and technological development

include access to natural transportation routes such as rivers and navigable coastlines; the

presence of natural barriers such as large bodies of water, mountain ranges, large rivers,

<center>81</center>

deserts, heavily forested areas, climate extremes; and, isolating factors such as being located on remote islands or in inaccessible mountain valleys. Isolating factors, compounded by limited access to natural resources such as those that might be experienced by an island society, as compared to ready access to resources common to a continentally based society, can also significantly influence security preferences. Observation suggests that it is possible to surmise that a continental society may be inclined to set defense of domestic resources as a security priority while an isolated and resource limited society may be more likely to set a security priority on ensuring mobility and secure access to trade routes and reliable trading partners.

Nolan and Lenski (2006) also contend that proximity to other societies can introduce competition over territory, access to or control of resources, and ideological or philosophical differences, often resulting in conflict. Proximity, however, can also result in similar values and the exchange of stimulating new ideas and beneficial innovations in subsistence technology. This exchange of ideas and innovations traditionally benefitted from a fortunate combination of the biophysical and the strategic environment. Geography can encourage transportation and communication allowing collaborative interaction among societies and communities due to trade, seasonal tribal or religious gatherings, seasonal migrations, and war as allies against a common adversary.

According to Nolan and Lenski (2006), changes in technology relative to geography (ref Figure 3) also had a profound influence on societies. A simple example is the impact on transportation and commerce made by the advent of the age of sail from the 15th to the 18th century and the introduction of the sextant in the 18th century. With a more efficient means of international travel and reliable navigation, primary routes of

commerce between societies shifted from the land to the sea. Societies that had previously thrived on land based trade routes, as a result, often faded into near oblivion. Quiet coastal communities with protected harbors experienced tremendous development and shipbuilding became a growth industry.

The ability of a society to capitalize on new technologies was also often linked to access to specialized natural resources. Ship building required access to timber suitable to the construction of hulls and masts and a subsistence technology that was robust enough to produce the surplus needed to support the development of specialists such as skilled artisans and sailors.

The type of a society also influenced interaction. Agrarian societies with a land owning, governing elite that saw the peasant majority as subhuman did not tend to see any value added in investing in the wellbeing or intellectual development of the bulk of the population. Socialization outside the governing elite, as a result, was limited and informal. There was also little interest within the elite to change the status quo. The landowning and governing elite saw a stable and secure power base in their ownership of the land and the requisite peasant population needed to work the land. This created a resistance to change and developmental inertia that resulted in limited progress in subsistence technological innovations. If not for the inflation introduced by exploration of the New World and the Industrial Revolution, agrarian societies would have been much slower to industrialize.

The social classifications described by Nolan and Lenski represent generalizations as opposed to hard and fast rules determining social organization and ordering. They are best considered as guidelines based on dominant subsistence technologies and the

culturally and genetically embedded social, political and economic organization that would allow a society to capitalize on the dominant strategic and biophysical environment. In any given situation the influence of additional, often complex and sometimes unexpected, environmental and strategic events or circumstances would require more in depth and extensive analysis. The social classifications do, however, provide guidelines and insights into the probable core values and organizational preferences of a society based on the evolving relationship between its strategic and biophysical environment and its subsistence technology. This cursory review, drawn primarily from Nolan and Lenski (2006)[128] cannot do justice to the full historical, and geographic, breadth and depth of the development of distinctive, human societies. As a thumbnail sketch, however, it should suffice as an indicator of the potential impact of both traditional and evolving core values and organizational preferences as shaped by the strategic and biophysical environment. It should also confirm the utility of further research into analytic possibilities associated with a better understanding of Strategic Culture as a phenomenon based on the relationship between the strategic and biophysical environment and distinctive, culturally embedded core values that could influence security preferences.

Strategic Culture, Geography, and Power

The preceding review of the history of human social development as an outcome of the dominant strategic and biophysical environment is necessary to appreciate the extent

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[128] Lenski, G., and Nolan, Patrick (2006). Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology - Tenth Edition. Boulder, Colorado, U.S.A., Paradigm Publishers.

to which geography can influence the values, social organization and priorities as well as the security choices of a variety of society types. The formative relationship, in particular, that existed between historical societies and their respective geographies is important to laying a foundation for understanding the concept of Strategic Culture. The land, and where it was positioned relative to competing societies, the resources available for the development of sustainable subsistence technologies, and the natural barriers and conduits for transportation and communication all influenced how a society would organize and order itself, what it would perceive as vital, core values, or capabilities, and what it would recognize as legitimate structures, hierarchies, and processes of social, economic, and political power or authority.

The dominant strategic and biophysical environments, seen from this historical perspective, influence what can become deeply embedded, shared perceptions of legitimate power, including the socially sanctioned means of acquiring, preserving and transferring power, including the legitimate use of force, and these can become so culturally embedded that they continue to influence the choices and preferences of a society even after it has moved past its early formative, subsistence technology-based, relationship with the physical environment.

Returning to the three key assumptions of Ecological-Evolutionary Theory (EET)[129] it is possible to see that two of the three assumptions represent assumed causal relationships with geography, the strategic and the biophysical environment, that can significantly influence how a society organizes and orders itself. The strategic environment, or

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[129] Lenski, *Human societies: An introduction to macrosociology - tenth edition.* page 18

proximity to other societies as potential competitors or collaborators, as well as the existence or absence of natural barriers and conduits such as open plains, rivers, oceans, and mountains further influence the advance or stagnation of subsistence technologies.

The third important assumption concerns a capacity to develop, and perpetuate a unique, cultural heritage. It is this capacity that enables a society to identify, and formalize processes and practices that have proven, over time, to ensure collective success. Survival also dictates that a society ensures the successful dissemination of these proven successful choices to successive generations through formal and informal socialization.

Included in the building of a cultural heritage specific to a particular strategic and biophysical environment are the identification and development of a distinctive political, social, economic, and spiritual organization and the associated leadership structures and processes, as well as the ordering or stratification of power within these structures and processes, which will ensure ongoing success. The development of a social organization derives, in part, from the selection of leaders who are the most skilled at and/or knowledgeable about the subsistence technologies relevant to the strategic and biophysical environment, and those most capable of ordering and organizing the rest of the population to maximize perceived success within that environment. The consistent success of a particular type or style of leadership and the associated, supporting leadership hierarchy or power stratification, becomes a culturally embedded recognition of what constitutes legitimate power or authority over a society or community as a whole.

Nolan and Lenski contend that the development of a cultural heritage, including the identification of legitimate power, based on, and reinforced by success, is passed down to subsequent generations through formal and informal socialization, and eventually becomes embedded in a society's fundamental identity. This cultural heritage includes core power relationships and power stratification, as well as core values, beliefs, and priorities, reinforced by generations of what a society perceives as successful application.

I thus propose that Strategic Culture is one of the cultural heritages embedded in a community or society and is historically reinforced and environmentally influenced. Key to this cultural heritage is the identification of legitimate sources and limits of power, as well as the legitimate transfer of that power and the legitimate use of force. Included in this is the identification of social behaviour that could undermine or compromise social order, or continued, collective success relative to those identified threats. A society or community tends to progress and expand, acquiring improved technologies and more complex social, religious, economic, and political organizations, in response to its changing relationship with the dominant strategic and biophysical environment. The dynamics of political and social power, codes of conduct, social and religious organization, and associated power hierarchies or stratification, as well as the recognized elites or sources of leadership authority, do not change easily (Nolan and Lenski 2006).[130] For example, if the governing elite of an agrarian society perceives land ownership as the legitimate source of their power, that becomes a core value in the cultural heritage of that elite. So much so that, when functional power shifts from land

[130] Ibid. page 45

ownership to ownership of the means of production, the historical, agrarian based, power elite of a community or society will continue to perceive land ownership as the only legitimate basis for governance and resist the shift.

The dominant strategic and biophysical environment provides key factors that influence a society's core values, responses and habits of behaviour, and are likely to influence how it will organize, and order itself, in response to its dominant strategic and biophysical environment, and its probable security preferences and priorities. Just as the environment can determine and influence how a society identifies threat and opportunity relative to their subsistence, it can also determine the means by which the society chooses to pre-position itself to achieve what they perceive are shared, collective, security objectives. The strategic and biophysical environment includes the existence of natural barriers and conduits of transportation and communication specific to a given society or group, as they can shape historical preferences related to both a defence against aggression and a means of expansion, trade and the exchange of ideas and technology.

The next step is to present a somewhat revised approach to and understanding of Strategic Culture, and then return to the challenges identified as facing Strategic Culture research. Key to this discussion is to appreciate the role that strategic and biophysical environments play as factors in Strategic Culture.

Chapter Four   Understanding Strategic Culture and Addressing the Challenges

The Proposed Definition

I contend that the preceding discussion confirms the relevance and potential utility

of my revised definition of Strategic Culture:

" Strategic Culture is the shared, social, economic, and political values and
priorities of a people, relevant to security preferences, as historically shaped and
embedded by repeated interaction with and adaptation to their prevailing strategic and
bio-physical environment."

This definition, though similar, is conceptually and structurally more succinct and

complete than others reviewed above. It is more complete and better able to support

reliable analysis in that it places shared human values in a causal relationship with the

independent variables of their unique strategic and biophysical environment. This allows

the researcher to observe the same phenomena, the same dynamic relationship, any actor

has with their specific dominant environment.

In terms of the language used in the definition, strategic refers to the adjective that

derives from the noun "strategy" as a particular long-term plan for success, especially in

politics, business, or conflict, suggesting a pre-positioning or preparing for strategic

advantage.[131] Culture refers to the "total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values and

knowledge, which constitute the shared basis of social action."[132] It is limited in the

proposed definition by "the shared, social, economic, and political values and priorities of

a society." It has been argued that culture is a difficult term to use as it is so broad and

inclined to multiple applications. Taken in conjunction with the qualifying adjective

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[131] , in *Gage Canadian dictionary.*, ed. V.E. Neufeld (Canada: Gage Publishing Ltd. , 1983.).
[132] .

"strategic," however, it is given a more specific context. In this instance, of particular relevance is the last phrase of the definition for culture which specifies that of a shared basis for social action. The reference in the proposed definition to "relevant to security preferences" specifies those aspects of culture, or shared, social, economic, and political values and priorities that are perceived to be relevant to ensuring a perception of strategic advantage specific to a society. The proposed definition of Strategic Culture thus describes a peoples' shared basis for collectively pre-positioning or organizing themselves for strategic advantage.

The reference to culture in general being historically shaped by repeated interaction with and adaptation to the prevailing strategic and bio-physical environment emphasizes a set of factors that have not been explored in earlier research. The proposed causal relationship between sociology and geography reflects the idea that the environment exerts a strong influence on society, its political organization and its shared values, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Key to political organization is the historical identification of legitimate power sources and the stratification of power within the political and social organization. I suggest that the society of the United Kingdom (UK), for example, comes from a predominantly agrarian society that was among the first to move to industrialization. Perceptions of power in the UK, however, continue to have strong emotional links to, or embedded cultural associations with land ownership, as evidenced by the continued existance of the House of Lords, once populated exclusively by members of the landowning aristocracy.

I contend, further, that much of the Middle East, retains strong emotional links to an embedded cultural association with herding societies and has traditionally identified legitimate power in terms of personal associations within, and control of, a strong following within the society. The elite was historically a significantly hierarchical patriarchy and associated power with control of subordinates, achieving high political and social esteem, both domestically and among the power elite of neigbouring societies by the number, calibre and loyalty, of subordinates, rather than in land ownership.

These are, admittedly, generalizations presented as simple, illustrative examples, but they are based on research done by sociologists, such as Nolan and Lanski, into the origins and staying power, or culturally embedded aspects, of human society types. As argued earlier, there is a significant relationship to be considered between a society or community and its historical, and currrent, strategic and biophysical environment, when and contemporary security preferences.

Strategic Culture is not a static phenomenon but a dynamic balancing of the culturally embedded core values with an evolving capacity of a people to coordinate and collaborate their efforts to capitalize on their strategic and biophysical environment and to develop both a progressive technology and an advantageous strategic relationship within a larger local, regional or global society. In a society with a particularly powerful ruling elite, furthermore, there may be strong resistance to advances in technologies that could compromise the status quo, thereby slowing or impeding the capacity of the society as a whole, to advance.

> "fundamental technological or social change is likley to affect the amount and distribution of valued goods. As a result, classes and groups that would lose benefits are likely to resist, and since they generally have more power and more

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resources than those that would gain, they are often able to delay or prevent change from taking place."[133]

The shared security objectives and priorities will evolve as a people develops its capacity to control or make best use of their strategic and biophysical environment. As the Strategic Culture of a people evolves, however, there will likely remain at its core some key aspects of the original influences of the strategic and biophysical environments that shaped their traditional, social, political and economic organizational priorities, values, trends and patterns.

Strategic Culture is a consequence of the dynamic relationship between the people of a society and the strategic and biophysical environment in which they live. It is itself dynamic in that it is subject to gradual change as the relationship with the environment changes. Where the dominant strategic and biophysical envioment will influence an embedded cultural heritage based on historical successes in subsistence technology and strategic relations, those same success will influence selective perpetuation of that cultural heritage. Strategic Culture is also dynamic in that it evolves in relation to the capacity of both the society and the dominant subsistence technology to create sufficient surplus necessary to support societal specialization and the further advancement of subsistence technology. If the environment, however, is particularly hostile or does not include natural conduits for transportation and information exchange, the diffusion of socialization and advances in subsistenc technology innovation will move slowly and the society will, overall, prove resistant to change.

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[133] Lenski, *Human societies: An introduction to macrosociology - tenth edition.* page 45.

Providing a revised definition for Strategic Culture is not an end in and of itself. It is a starting point. The concept itself is an analytic tool that can contribute to ongoing efforts to understand better the social, economic, and political challenges and opportunities facing people in the twenty-first century. Improved understanding can contribute to a more objective appreciation of the concerns and priorities of the diverse range of stakeholders competing for dominance in global security.

Previous research on Strategic Culture has proposed a range of challenges. If the relationship between a society and its strategic and biophysical environment are key factors largely missing in earlier research, or at least inadequately explored therein, it should be possible to revisit and overcome these challenges.

Challenges Facing Strategic Culture Research

Researchers into Strategic Culture have identified several challenges that confounded understanding. These were referenced throughout the earlier literature review. Revisiting these challenges in the context of the above statement of understanding seems potentially beneficial.

1.   Where does the culture in question lie?

The concept of culture, as mentioned earlier, has often been described as complex and difficult to define. Refining the concept with the adjective of strategic increases understanding, but it still lacks sufficient clarity to support consistent comparative analysis. Portraying Strategic Culture as those shared values, responses, and habitual patterns of behaviour relevant to security and resulting in part from the relationship a society has with its biophysical and social environment grounds the concept and may

facilitate consistent identification and reliable application, particularly in comparative analysis.

The influence of the biophysical and strategic environment on a society shapes its core understanding of legitimate power relationships. As a result, Strategic Culture can influence the design and ordering, or tiering, of power and authority both within a society and with other competing or complementing societies or communities. This aspect of human cultural heritage reflects what constitutes legitimate power in a given society, and as a result, can influence leadership selection, governance style and security priorities in internal and external relationships.

2.   The roots of Strategic Culture are not well accounted for.

Existing research pays rather little attention to investigating the key factors that generally influence Strategic Culture and has certainly largely omitted analysis of the influence of strategic geography and the related social and political environment in shaping Strategic Culture. The addition of the biophysical and strategic environments as factors broadens our understanding of Strategic Culture as an observable phenomenon in multiple contexts.

3.   Patterns of behaviour characteristic of a Strategic Culture have not been well elaborated in existing treatments, and some discussions imply that strategic thought leads consistently to one particular type of behaviour.

There have been few generalized attempts to predict behaviour based on Strategic Culture. Some analysis of this sort may be inclined to cultural stereotyping rather than reliable comparative analysis. Linking the concept of Strategic Culture to the strategic and biophysical environment may provide an analytic frame of reference that might facilitate prediction of behaviour.

4.   The assumption that a society's Strategic Culture is homogeneous and fixed across time is likely false.

Some researchers have tended to assume a uniform and static Strategic Culture associated with each state. The concept is almost certainly an evolving phenomenon based on the dynamic relationship a society has with its strategic environment and other factors. Progress in technologies, control of the biophysical environment, improved capacity for specialization, and increased productivity can lead to increased complexity and stratification within a society. Core values based on perceptions of legitimate power sources and power relationships may evolve to meet changing strategic, social, economic and political needs.

Strategic geography shapes aspects of the cultural heritage of a society including its Strategic Culture. Instead of trying to determine which came first, the culture or the behaviour, we need to understand the more complex, dynamic relationship between the environment and a society that determines responsive behaviour. Successful choices and behaviour patterns are repeated, reinforced and sufficiently socialized by historical application that they become a part of the society's cultural heritage and subsequently influence future behaviour.

5.   Elites that lead strategic decision making have been socialized in and may therefore be constrained by the same symbolic myths and traditions of their predecessors.

According to the proposed definition and model of Strategic Culture, the strategic environment plays a significant role in determining both the means of leadership selection and the order and structure of governance and society best suited to the historical technology that shaped the values, priorities, and preferences of a society. The

subsequent stratification of the society will tend to correspond to the order and structure

of governance in terms of the extent of control, or access to legitimate power allotted to

different levels of a society. Core aspects of this stratification will become embedded in

the cultural heritage of the society. Individual and group placement in the organizational

structure, often determined by characteristics such as economic status, age and gender,

will influence preferences either to maintain the power relationship status quo or to move

towards change. A society can evolving and develop new formal and informal

socialization processes. Different levels in the social power hierarchy may attach

different significance to the symbolic myths and traditions of their predecessors based on

their proximity to and control of power within their society. These differences can be

more readily understood and even quantified when analyzed from the perspective of a

Strategic Culture linked to historical and evolving biophysical and strategic geographical

influences.

6.   There has been an over-emphasis on realist assumptions and analysis.

Realism employs a state-centric analysis of international relations which is

diminishing in relevance as technology empowers and links more and more stakeholders

in the game of international security. Ken Booth noted the dwindling relevance of

realism as a basis for analysis in his 1994 paper 'Security and Self Reflections of a Fallen

Realist,' noting that:

> "Critical security studies begin in a rejection of traditional security theory. It
> rejects, in particular: the definition of politics that places the state and its
> sovereignty at the centre of the subject; the moral authority of states; the belief that
> the state is and should be the key 'guardian of peoples"[134]

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[134] Booth, "*Security and self reflections of a fallen realist..*" page 17

Human societies have self-organized in an evolving and varied range of society types that adapted their historical political organization and ordering to meet the dominant strategic and biophysical environmental challenges to security. Before the state, there was the city state and before that there were towns, villages, tribes, and clans. In short, the key stakeholders have changed.

Today international modes of instant information and capital transfer and exchange, as well as rapid transnational transportation of goods, services, ideas, and people are changing the security challenges facing human societies. New social constructs based more on shared interests or objectives, and less on geographic proximity are beginning to emerge and influence security choices at the individual, community, state and international level.

Chapter Five   Summary and Conclusion

The definition for Strategic Culture proposed in this thesis is particularly relevant to understanding the emerging twenty-first century global community. The concept has the potential to be a useful analytic tool in assessing the objectives and intent in the rhetoric and actions of a growing diversity of stakeholders. As Elizabeth Stone suggested in her literature review for the 2006 Curriculum Study, "there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper motives for what in fact they do."[135] From the perspective of the development of security policy, Strategic Culture has the potential to provide a better appreciation of the real strategic perspective of a potential adversary or ally in an emerging or potential conflict or contest of ideologies.

Previous research referred to a need to use cross discipline studies. The research behind this paper benefitted greatly when it expanded beyond the academic confines of political science and international relations (IR) theory. By exploring the concept of culture and even of Strategic Culture from the expanded perspective of sociology and geography it was possible to achieve a new dimensionality of understanding and connect IR theory to human, social, behavioural, theory. There would be value in developing a collaborative, cross disciplinary approach to further research that incorporated further research complementing studies, not only in sociology and geography, but also in psychology and anthropology.

Researchers have also identified a need to learn from the past. There is double relevance to this recommendation. First, it is important to build on existing research not

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[135] Stone, "Comparative strategic culture: A literature review (part 1)." page 2.

only in Strategic Culture, but in pre-existing, related concepts such as political culture and national identity. The study of international relations, furthermore, will benefit more from a collaborative accumulation of ideas and insights than it will from a linear refuting of competing theories. The story of modern society represents no more than a heartbeat in the grander history of human societies, and yet the changes of the past century alone, the technological and organizational changes in particular, have been both profound in impact and rapid in transition. There is significant value in approaching an analysis of contemporary, international, or human, relations from a deeper historical, geographic, and sociological perspective. A better understanding of the strategic and biophysical origins of human societies can provide valuable insights into the probable embedded core values and power relations that underlie contemporary social constructs, whether they are communities, traditional states, non-governmental organizations, corporations, dominant religious groups, interest groups, organized criminals, or terrorists.

Approaching a definition of Strategic Culture through the lens of social constructivism allows analysis to include with the state a range of non-state stakeholders as social constructs relevant to international relations and global security analysis. The increasing variety of relevant actors, or stakeholders, in international relations recommends that research move past linear, theoretical, modelling, and adopt a more lateral and networked approach.

There are arguments that claim the Industrial Age is still in full swing, but this perspective has been challenged, more and more often, with the view that the information age has taken over. Social, economic, and political organizations are beginning to feel the effects of this transition to an information based society as networked organizational

structures begin to supplant traditional hierarchical models. Successful social and

business relations have become more and more dependent on same-time, networked,

information management and instant, networked, communication. In many regards the

rapid advance of computer based information development, management and

dissemination represents the introduction of a virtual strategic environment with ideas,

information, and abstracted representations of traditional currencies or monetary

representations of power, becoming virtual manifestations of subsistence technologies.

The emerging of a grass roots networked virtual environment, furthermore, is proving

more responsive to crisis than traditional, bureaucratically top-heavy governments and

multinational corporations, undermining public confidence in these establishments.

> "Exponential technological changes are redefining, broadening and fragmenting the media landscape in dramatic ways. They impact directly and profoundly by way of two new realities: first, on longstanding assumptions about the nature of the media in a crisis; secondly – and even more fundamentally – on the nature of power because the effectiveness of existing structures and their relations with the public are perceived as inadequate."[136]

The face of conflict itself has undergone a similar transformation. Success in the

battlefield has become more and more dependent on having a capacity for instant,

reliable, information exchange, and immediate but secure communications. The threats of

today and tomorrow are no longer driven, exclusively, by state centric concerns and

priorities. Instead they have become increasingly more "diffuse, dispersed, multi-

dimensional nonlinear, and ambiguous than industrial-age threats."[137]

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[136] Nick Gowing, "'Sky Full of Lies' and Black Swans: The new tyranny of shifting information power in crisis," *RISJ Challenges*, no. July 2009 (2009).
[137] Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature.*." page 9

Strategic Culture as redefined in this thesis proposes a direct causal relationship between the shared, social, economic, and political values and priorities of a people and their prevailing strategic and bio-physical environment.

The structural inclusion in the proposed definition of the strategic and biophysical environments as necessary independent variables, furthermore, allows the researcher to observe the same phenomena, the same dynamic relationship, any actor has with their specific dominant environment.

This redefinition for Strategic Culture also holds the promise of providing a firmer conceptual foundation for further research and successful operational application to a variety of social constructs. Effective future research will not only continue to build on all that has gone before, but will also benefit from a little calculated hindsight. The proposed definition can be tested for future operational, and comparative utility by retrospective application in a variety of context specific, historical security scenarios, with known conflict outcomes, to confirm the reliability of the proposed definition. Once the proposed definition is confirmed in this manner, it will be possible to take research to the next level and establish a basis for reliable comparative analysis. This will involve identification of appropriate, specific, conceptual components, within the strategic and biophysical environment, that qualify as independent variables, with sufficient universality for reliable application. These variables should include measurable characteristics that could impact on embedded and evolving social, political, economic, and even psychological preferences and priorities relevant to probable security choices.

A final goal of future research should be to establish terms of reference for reliable application of a comparative analysis matrix that would include a precondition of

reflective, or self-analysis. It is noteworthy, in this regard, to point out that Strategic Culture, though fairly young as a concept, has conceptual origins that date back to the classical writings of Sun Tzu who contended that success in battle was heavily dependent on knowledge and understanding of both the enemy and yourself. In 'The Art of Warfare' Chapter 3 he states:

> "So to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all.
>
> These five factors are the way (tao) of anticipating victory.
> Thus it is said:
> He who knows the enemy and himself - Will never in a hundred battles be at risk;
> He who does not know the enemy but knows himself – Will sometimes win and sometimes lose;
> He who knows neither the enemy nor himself – Will be at risk in every battle."[138]

Theorists and philosophers have long held that it was best to know and understand your adversaries, but as Sun Tzu pointed out, it was necessary to also know yourself. If the policy makers of a society or organization are not aware of their own Strategic Culture, they may inadvertently and erroneously project their own perceptions of threat and opportunity, their own terms of reference for legitimate power and legitimate power transfer, when trying to determine and understand the choices of a perceived adversary. Strategic Culture, given a reliable definition, has the potential to overcome misunderstanding in international relations.

It has already been argued that future research into Strategic Culture will benefit significantly from a multidisciplinary approach. Given the impact of the information age and the growing transnational nature of human relations and interactions, knowledge

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[138] C. Carr, ed. *The book of war : Sun-Tzu's "The art of war" & Karl Von Clausewitz's "On war"*. (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Random House Inc: 2000 Modern Library Paperback Edition., 2000). page 80 - 81

itself and research in a variety of fields is moving towards a more disicpline inclusive

approach to expanding human understanding. Strategic Culture is a compelling concept,

in part because it offers the prospect of improved understanding of collective human

activities related to security. It also offers analytic tools relevant to reflective analysis,

both for the individual and organizational groupings, and subsequent improved self

understanding. It has been tempting to include reference to Maslow's hierarchy of needs

theories[139], but that falls outside the bounds and contraints of simply proposing a reliable

definition, and will have more relevance when it comes time to establish a matrix for

comparative analysis that includes measurable and quantifiable Strategic Culture

variables applicable at the micro and the macro levels. Maslow's Hierarchy has

fascinating applications when attempting to determine where an individual, or a human

society, stands developmentally, based on their level of subsistence technology and their

capacity to produce sufficient surplus to support specialization. It will also have utility in

determing the stratification of Strategic Culture within any one group, community or

society.

It is particularly important, in closing, to establish parameters for successful future

application of Strategic Culture as an analytic tool. Scenarios that would benefit from

Strategic Culture analysis are often extremely complex with multiple historical,

environmental, and social layers impacting on stakeholder security preferences. Unless

and until a basis for comparative analysis is developed, there will be a tendency to make

invalid, sweeping, often ethno-, gender-, or generational-centric, generalizations in the

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[139] A. H. Maslow, *Toward a psychology of being: Second edition.* (USA.: Van Nostrand Reinhold., 1982.).

name of Strategic Culture. There will also be a tendency to want to apply the concept as a predictive tool as opposed to employing it as a useful, but not exclusive, analytic tool for deeper understanding of the complex issues shaping stakeholder security choices and preferences in a given scenario.

Strategic Culture, as defined in this thesis, is not yet, and may never be, a reliable, predictive tool. Political and security scenarios today are far too complex and dynamic to incorporate all the relevant independent, intervening, and dependent variables to support accurate behavioural predictions. The concept, however, has the potential to become a useful tool, if incorporated in a well-defined analytic process, to improve communication and cross cultural understanding.

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Appendix 1 Strategic Culture Definitions

STRATEGIC CULTURE DEFINITIONS TABLE		
		FIRST WAVE
1977	Jack Snyder[140]	"the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy."
1979	Ken Booth[141]	"refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force."
1981	Colin Gray[142]	"there is a discernible American strategic "culture": that culture referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization (e.g., as an American, what am I?, how should I feel, think, and behave?), and from all of the many distinctively American experiences (of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, and "way of life") that characterize an American citizen . . . . there is an American (and, by extension, other) Strategic Culture-which flows from geopolitical, historical, economic, and other unique influences. Second, that American Strategic Culture provides the milieu within which strategic ideas and defense policy decisions are debated and decided. Third, it is suggested here that an understanding of American Strategic Culture (and, by extension, "style") can help explain why American policymakers have made the decisions they have"
The First Wave of Strategic Culture shows a selection of proposed definitions and descriptions. For many papers, especially in the first two waves, there was little new in the way of definitions but more a tendency to describe, explain or present context specific examples without benefit of concise definition. Many also simply referred to the existing proposed definitions of Snyder, Gray and Johnston.		
		SECOND WAVE
1984	Colin Gray[143]	referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perceptions of the national historical experience, aspirations for cultural conformity
1990	David R. Jones[144]	"three levels of inputs into a state's Strategic Culture: a macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethno cultural characteristics, and history; a societal level consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society; and a micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations. This Strategic Culture did not just delimit strategic options; it pervaded all levels of choice from grand strategy down to tactics."
The Second Wave of Strategic Culture showed a waning in popularity for the concept at this point. Once again, there was little new in the way of definitional research but a continued tendency to describe, explain or present context specific examples without benefit of concise definition. Many also simply referred to the existing proposed definitions of Snyder, and Gray.		
		THIRD WAVE
1995	Alastair Ian Johnson[145]	"different predominant strategic preferences rooted in early formative experiences of state, influenced to some degree by philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of state and its elites."

[140] Snyder, "*The Soviet strategic culture: Implications for limited nuclear operations.*."
[141] K. Booth, *Strategy and ethnocentrism.* (Croom Helm., 1979.).
[142] Gray, "*National style in strategy: The American example.*."
[143] Gray, "*Comparative strategic culture.*."
[144] D. R. Jones, "*Soviet strategic culture.*," in *Strategic power : USA/USSR Ed. by Carl G. Jacobsen* (New York.: St. Martin's Press., 1990.).
[145] Johnston, *Cultural realism, strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history.*

1995	Alastair Ian Johnston[146]	"Strategic Culture is an integrated system of symbols (i.e. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious."
1998	Andrew Scobell[147]	"the fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and military elites in a country. These assumptions will vary from country to country."
1998	Major Russell A. Moore[148]	The concept of Strategic Culture has been defined in various ways at both the strategic and operational levels. Throughout the literature, three common elements of Strategic Culture have emerged: 1) Strategic Culture provides a value system in the context of strategic decision making; 2) this value system is held by a specific community; and 3) the "outputs" (security policy, doctrine, etc.) of this community are affected by Strategic Culture. The sources of a particular community's Strategic Culture include geography, history, the worldview of the regime (religion, ideology, culture), economic factors, and the organization of government and military institutions.
1999	Graeme P. Herd[149]	"the set of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, norms, world-views and patterns of habitual behaviour held by strategic decision makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the best way to achieve it."51 (Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," 1991) and,
1999	Colin S. Gray[150]	Ideas about war and strategy are influenced by physical and political geography-some Strategic Cultures plainly have, for example, a maritime or a continentalist tilt-by political or religious ideology, and by familiarity with, and preference for, particular military technologies. Strategic Culture is the world of mind, feeling, and *habit in behaviour.*
2001	Rajesh M. Basrur[151]	Strategic Culture may be defined, in Colin Gray's words, as 'the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions, habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation - that is, behaviour - that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community' (1999: 28).
2001	Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards[152]	defined as the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU's legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities (albeit limited).
2003	Robert M. Cassidy[153]	military-Strategic Culture is a set of beliefs, attitudes, and values within the military establishment that shape collective (shared) preferences of how and when military means should be used to accomplish strategic aims. It is derived or developed as a result of historical experience, geography, and political culture. Core leaders perpetuate and inculcate it, but it is most pronounced at the operational level because, when armies have met with success in war, it is the operational techniques and the operational histories by which enemies were defeated and which are consecrated in memory. Finally, while military-Strategic Culture is not quantifiable, one can empirically discern preferences for how and when to use military forces. These qualitative preferences are observable in military doctrine, military operations, and in statements by the core military elites.

[146] Johnston, "*Thinking about strategic culture.*"

[147] Scobell, *China and strategic culture.*

[148] R. A. Moore, "*Strategic culture--How it affects strategic "outputs".*" in *Marine Corps War College.* (Quantico,VA.: Marine Corps University., 1998.).

[149] G. P. Herd, "*III. EU–Turkey clashing political and strategic cultures as stumbling blocks on the road to accession?*," (Geneva Centre for Security Policy., 1999).

[150] Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review of International Studies* Vol. 25, no. No. 1 (1999).

[151] R. M. Basrur, "*Nuclear weapons and Indian strategic culture.*," *Journal of Peace Research.* Vol. 38, no. No. 2 (2001).

[152] P. Cornish, G. Edwards., "*Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: The beginnings of a European strategic culture.*," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Changing Patterns of European Security and Defence.* Vol. 77., no. No. 3. (2001.).

[153] R. M. Cassidy, "*Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military strategic culture and the paradoxes of asymetric conflict.*," in *Strategic Studies Institute.* (Carlisle, PA.: U.S. Army War College., 2003).

2003	Georgios Skemperis[154]	I consider Strategic Culture as an amalgam of beliefs, images, and symbols carried by the people – including the decision-making elites – of a country regarding, in a broader term, the relationship between their country and the rest of the world, and, more specifically, foreign policy and national security. Strategic Culture is created or modified either by the ruling elites through propaganda, or by the effects of vivid events and shocks, or both. The major feature of Strategic Culture is the fact that it becomes dogmatic. It encourages and enhances the tendency of people to abstain from the time- and effort consuming procedure of searching for incoming information, analyzing and reaching rational suppositions or conclusions. It does that by offering them a "pre-cooked" and broadly acceptable position on foreign policy and security.
2003	Sten Rynning[155]	Thus, constructivists would argue that we must study the EU by assessing the way in which EU policy is shaped by embedded ideas in addition to the external balance of power – which will perhaps lead us to appreciate the growing influence of these ideas over time. Classical realists take issue with such an approach to strategic ideas and culture because they refuse to separate culture and behaviour – akin to separating mind and body – and thus refuse to accept the argument that geopolitical behaviour may *not* be influenced by Strategic Culture.
2004	Herman L. Wilkes, Jr.[156]	an integrated "system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious." Johnston, 1995, paraphrases Geertz 1973 definition of religion as a cultural system.
2004	Vassilis Margaras[157]	Thus Strategic Culture as a 'system of symbols' comprises two parts: the first consists of basic assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic environment, that is, about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero-sum or variable sum) and about the efficacy of the use of force (about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the conditions under which applied force is useful). Together these comprise the central paradigm of Strategic Culture.'(Johnston 1995)
2004	Christopher O. Meyer[158]	emphasises the role of ideas, norms, identities and worldviews for understanding how actors interpret social reality and construct their interests in international affairs and EU institutions through these cognitive lenses. They do not dispute that material circumstances, such as anarchy of the international system and differences in the distribution of power capabilities matter for actors, but suggest that these differences are often not sufficient for understanding states' behaviour in foreign affairs.
2005	Peter Lavoy[159]	" a hierarchy of different strategic 'myths' that interact with the material constraints and the preferences of particular leaders."
2005	Andrew Scobell[160]	"Strategic Culture should be thought of as a typology or hierarchy, and insisted that the lines of Strategic Culture become very blurred above the operational level and at the level of grand strategy."
2006	Willis Stanley[161]	"the role of religion and the influence of ancient Persian and Islamic cultures to explain the broader patterns of contemporary Iranian political and strategic choices . . . a revolutionary interpretation of Shia Islam, the influences of Persian culture and Islamic exceptionalism, extremely complex, consistent, and far-reaching familial relationships, and a continuing belief that that Iran is far superior than its neighbors creates a perpetual and distinct Iranian Strategic Culture."

[154] G. Skemperis, "*Strategic culture in post-war Europe.*" (Final Paper., Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University., 2003.).

[155] S. Rynning, "*The European Union: Towards a strategic culture?*," *Security Dialogue.* 2003., no. 34. (2003.).

[156] Jr. Wilkes, H. L, "*Spain, the European Union and the United States in the age of terror: Spanish strategic culture and the global war on terror.*" (Naval Post Graduate School., 2004.).

[157] V. Margaras, "*Strategic culture: The concept.*," in *International relations & European studies (PIRES).* (UK.: Department of Politics, Loughborough University., 2004.).

[158] C. O. Meyer, "*Theorizing European strategic culture between convergence and the persistence of national diversity.*," (Centre for European Policy Studies., June 2004).

[159] Stone, "*Comparative strategic culture, conference report..*"

[160] A. Scobell, "*Strategic culture and China: IR theory versus the fortune cookie?*," *Strategic Insights.* Volume IV., no. Issue 10. (2005.).

[161] W. Stanley, "*The strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran.*," in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum.* (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office., 2006).

2005	Jeffrey Lantis[162]	"culture is an evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions, and offers little in the way of testable hypotheses . . . Strategic Culture possessed a strong degree of continuity, and highlighted that more often than not past learning becomes sedimented into the collective consciousness of a population or group." Also - Identifying Strategic Culture as a set of shared assumptions and decision rules prompts the question of how they are maintained, and by whom?
2005	Theo Farrell[163]	"Strategic Culture must always be viewed and analyzed as an open system . . . culture itself is more or less consistent . . . both internal and external shocks occur – and the impact of such shocks are hugely important – but the culture more often than not settles and continues on as a constant norm."
2005	Henrikki Heikka[164]	"a realist Strategic Culture could be defined as one where states construct their grand strategies and strategic practices in relation to power alone, with a view to balancing power as such, no matter what the identity of the power" (Barry Posen 1987)
2005	Iver B. Neumann, and Henrikki Heikka[165]	"we refashion the concept of Strategic Culture as a dynamic interplay of potential grand strategy, on the one hand, and specific practices such as doctrines, civil–military relations and procurement on the other. The key source of inspiration for this reconceptualization is the so-called 'practice turn' in anthropology and sociology."
2005	Darryl Howlett[166]	"a methodology that is falsifiable and leads to cumulative research, which can be used for future prediction. This view considers Strategic Culture to be "an independent variable and behavior as a dependent variable, and pitting the culturalist explanation of behavior against alternative explanations, such as realist and institutionalist ones." (Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, 2005)
2005	Darryl Howlett and John Glenn[167]	The study of Denmark identifies two forms of Strategic Culture: cosmopolitanism and defencism. Cosmopolitanism stresses neutrality, alternative non-military means of conflict resolution and the importance of international institutions such as the former League of Nations and the United Nations. In contrast, defencism emphasizes both the importance of military preparedness encapsulated in the dictum 'if you want peace, you must prepare for war' and of regional military organizations, such as NATO, in defending the country and deterring would-be aggressors
2005	Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards[168]	Our definition of Strategic Culture as the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere
The Third Wave of research efforts to define or describe the concept of Strategic Culture showed a resurgence in interest resulting in an increase in articles on the subject but there remained an inability to achieve consensus with regards to a definition.		
		"CURRENT THOUGHT"
2006	Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Conference[169]	Strategic Culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives. and - "The agreed upon foundation for Strategic Culture consists mainly of a consensus on including culture as a variable in analyzing foreign policy and security decisions." and - Johnston (1995) portrays Strategic Culture as "an ideational milieu which limits behavior choices." This milieu is shaped by "shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment."

[162] J. S. Lantis, "*EU strategic culture and US ambivalence.*," *Oxford Journal on Good Governance.* Vol 2., no. No. 1. (2005.).

[163] T. Farrell, "*Strategic culture and American empire.*," *SAIS Review.* Volume 25., no. Number 2. (2005).

[164] H. Heikka, "*Republican realism : Finnish strategic culture in historical perspective.*," *Cooperation and Conflict.* 40., no. 91. (2005).

[165] Neumann, "*Grand strategy, strategic culture, practice : The social roots of Nordic defence..*"

[166] Howlett, "*Strategic culture: Reviewing recent literature..*"

[167] D. Howlett, J. Glenn., "*Epilogue: Nordic strategic culture.*," *Cooperation and Conflict.* 40., no. 121. (2005.).

[168] Cornish, "*The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report..*"

[169] Johnson, "*Comparative strategic culture syllabus.*"

2006	Peter R. Lavoy[170]	Stephen Rosen's (1996) approach is very similar, observing that Strategic Culture is made up of the shared "beliefs and assumptions that frame … choices about international military behavior, particularly those concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable."
2006	Colin S. Gray[171]	Strategic Culture is of interest because the concept suggests, perhaps insists, that different security communities think and behave somewhat differently about strategic matters. Those differences stem from communities' distinctive histories and geographies.
2006	Fritz W. Ermarth[172]	It is that body of broadly shared, powerfully influential, and especially enduring attitudes, perceptions, dispositions, and reflexes about national security in its broadest sense, both internal and external, that shape behavior and policy.
2006	Jerry Mark Long[173]	In this approach, we will take "Strategic Culture" to indicate an ideational milieu, one that makes important assumptions about the fundamental values of the community, the nature of the enemy that threatens those values, and the role of war in defending the same.8 These fundamental values coalesce in what we will term a meta-narrative, the overarching story that situates individuals in a distinct community, provides a cognitive roadmap by which they are to live, and that motivates members to protect the community against its enemies, even in the face of death.
2006	Darryl Howlett[174]	The consensus reached was that a definition was available and that Strategic Culture can be understood as a set of "shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives." The definition consequently acknowledges that Strategic Culture is a product of a range of circumstances such as geography, history and narratives that shape collective identity, but one which also allows it a role in both enabling and constraining decisions about security.
2006	Thomas G. Mahnken[175]	A nation's Strategic Culture flows from its geography and resources, history and experience, and society and political structure.4 It represents an approach that a given state has found successful in the past. Although not immutable, it tends to evolve slowly. It is no coincidence, for example, that Britain has historically favored sea power and indirect strategies, or that it has traditionally eschewed the maintenance of a large army. Israel's lack of geographic depth, its small but educated population, and technological skill have produced a Strategic Culture that emphasizes strategic pre-emption, offensive operations, initiative, and – increasingly – advanced technology. (Michael I. Handel 1994), Australia's minimal geopolitical status, its continental rather than maritime identity, and its formative military experiences have shaped its way of war. (Michael Evans 2005)
2009	Roger Barnett[176]	"consists of shared beliefs, values, and habits among persons in a military or paramilitary organization with regard to the use of military force."

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[170] P. R. Lavoy, "*Pakistan's strategic culture.*," in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum.* (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office., 2006.).

[171] C. S. Gray, "*Out of the wilderness: Prime-time for strategic culture.*," in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum.* (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office., 2006.).

[172] F. W. Ermarth, "*Russia's strategic culture: Past, present, and… in transition?*," in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum.* (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office., 2006.).

[173] J. M. Long, "*Strategic culture, Al-Qaida, and weapons of mass destruction.*," in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum.* (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office., 2006.).

[174] D. Howlett, "*The future of strategic culture.*," in *Defence Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office.* (USA.2006.).

[175] T. G. Mahnken, "*United States strategic culture.*," in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum.* (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office., 2006.).

[176] R. Barnett, *Navy strategic culture: Why the Navy thinks differently.* (US Naval Institute Press., 2009).

2009	Rashed Uz Zaman[177]	Two general categories based on the methodological approach.38 The first is characterized as "broad descriptive." The body of literature on Strategic Culture that emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s constitutes this category. Its approach to the subject involves broad historical analyses of patterns in the strategic behaviour of specific states, attributing culturally derived causes to those patterns, and then projecting them into the future. The "analytical school" of Strategic Culture made its appearance in the 1990s and offers an alternative to the broad descriptive approach. In this approach, analytical scholars use narrower definitions of culture and more rigorous methods for testing its effects on specific classes of strategic behavior. This becomes necessary in cases in which rational-actor models and realist-based definitions of interest fail to explain particular choices adequately.
2009	Jeffrey S. Lantis[178]	Strategic Culture is characterized as a discrete force that shapes the security policy decision-making environment. It may be a function of common historical experiences, geo-strategic circumstances, elite articulations of national identity, and even myths and traditions. The legacies of colonialism play a role in modern national identity and Strategic Culture in African states, for example; Chinese and Russian Strategic Cultures appear to be steeped in history and regional rivalries (and a combination thereof, lending to historical insecurity).Citing Alastair Iain Johnston 1995
2010	Caroline S. Conzelman[179]	"the combination of internal and external influences and experiences…that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship to the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international community"

Discussion on the concept of Strategic Culture since 2006 still shows a tendency to describe the impact of the concept as opposed to building towards a definition. There is greater agreement on what it is supposed to influence, and on the separate aspects of the concept, but nothing that links it to a causal agency, no measurable indicator of "why" it occurs.

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[177] Rashed Uz Zaman, "Strategic Culture: A "Cultural" Understanding of War," *Comparative Strategy* 28, no. 1 (2009).

[178] Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (2009).

[179] Caroline S. Conzelman, "*Agrarian sindicato democracy and Evo Morales's new coca leaf politics: An anthropological perspective on Bolivian strategic culture.*," in *Bolivia Strategic Culture Workshop.* (Florida International University, Miami, Florida.: Florida International University Applied Research Center, and United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). 2010).

Appendix 2 Strategic Culture Trends and Challenges

Strategic Culture Trends and Challenges		
Monterey Conference 2005		Where does the culture in question lie?
		Where does the behaviour that it shapes exist?
Stone	First Wave	The concept, as presented in early research was unwieldy
		Patterns of behaviour were included within the definition, implying that strategic thought led consistently to one type of behaviour
		There was a problematic assumption that there was homogeneity to a society's Strategic Culture that carried across time. resulted in a static and uniform Strategic Culture unaffected by changing social, economic or political characteristics within a given society
	Second Wave	Research acknowledged levels or tiers of Strategic Culture distinguished by the perceptions and objectives of analysts
		Political leaders could use the concept as justification to legitimize the use of violence against alleged enemies
		treatments of the first wave as being unwieldy in part because they tried to include so many variables
		attempts to link culture and behaviour. Does Strategic Culture influence behaviour?
	Third Wave	Research was more rigorous and eclectic in its conceptualization of ideational independent variables
		Research was critical of realist and structural materialist thinking as inadequate to explain strategic choices
	Way Ahead	There was a need to learn from past literature
		A need to use cross discipline studies
		A need to adopt a more inclusive approach to the concept that recognized its relevance in application to non-state actors in an analysis of strategic decision making
Lantis		Who are the keepers of Strategic Culture?
		Is Strategic Culture a fixed and static phenomenon of human societies or an evolving and transformative one?
		What is the universality of Strategic Culture? Can researchers define it in a way that supports consistent and reliable application?
		the need for a common definition
		need to identify a measurable process by which a Strategic Culture is created, maintained, and passed on to subsequent generations
Howlett		to improve on thinking about Strategic Culture by considering a framework for analysis that could be applied at a regional or transnational level.
		the impact of the internet
		The tendency to view terrorists not as criminals outside the laws of nations, but as armed enemies.
		Are Strategic Cultures immutable or do they change over time?
		a growing inclination to use sociology and anthropology particularly to develop a more dynamic understanding of culture as it relates to strategic thinking.
		future research would benefit from embracing related developments in other disciplines.
		recommended the development of actor specific behavioural models for different adversaries.
Curriculum Conference 2006		How is state identity formed? Which factors are primary influences? How does this affect security policy?

		How do values become policy? Can significant gaps exist between policy that is aspired to, and policy that is actuated?
		To what extent do global norms impact domestic Strategic Culture?
		How static/dynamic is Strategic Culture? What causes change? How quickly can Strategic Culture shift in a crisis?
		To what extent can leaders leverage and/or manipulate Strategic Culture for their own ends?
		Can the Strategic Culture analytical framework be applied to non-state actors?
		Does each culture develop its own way of war?
		How does one discern the "keepers" or "stewards" of a particular Strategic Culture? Are they persons? Or institutions? How is the socialization process perpetuated?
		To what extent does geography determine Strategic Culture?
		How do the market forces of globalization affect Strategic Culture? Are there emerging non-Western perspectives that might counter the power of globalization?
		Is the Strategic Culture in question relatively homogenous, or factionalized? If disparate groups are competing for the ability to direct security policy, how might one determine which viewpoint will be most relevant?
		Can significant portions of Strategic Culture be innovated? Taught from the top levels of government down, and internalized?
		How might intelligence and diplomatic processes be improved to unearth accurate data on Strategic Culture?
		If we assume that there are three levels of analysis in studying a country's Strategic Culture—our own, our adversaries, and our allies—do we tend to overlook our allies?

Appendix 3 A Contractual Agreement Between Parties