Thesis Prospectus

Revised Objective:  A definition of Strategic Culture

    I have been advised to rethink the MA thesis.  Good advice.  The recommendation is to pull back from a comparison of the Strategic Cultures of Britain and Japan 1940 - 46 and simply define the concept of Strategic Culture.  This makes perfect sense to me, given that there is, as yet, no consensus on a definition.  The original undertaking can then be addressed as a comparative study based on the definition. 

    As a starting point I will continue to gather whatever I can find on the concept itself.  Much of the material found so far is rich with the names and ideas of others who have strayed down this path before.  I like the potential I sense lurking in hidden pockets of insight that lie around the various twists and turns that lie ahead in this direction.

Research Question – What is Strategic Culture?

(Royal Roads University:

Human Security and Peace Building MA Program - Research Methodology Unit

Individual Research Proposed Topic: Defining Strategic Culture)

Strategic Culture, particularly its comparative analysis, is a compelling subject that may hold tremendous potential as an analytic tool in multilateral and international communication and conflict avoidance/ mitigation/resolution.  Colin Gray, however, on his 1984 article on Comparative Strategic Culture[1], was quick to point out both its appeal and the challenges inherent in relying upon its explanatory power.

Compelling as it may be to want to forge ahead into a comparative application of the concept itself, it is essential to escape this “fog of culture” and understand exactly what is meant by Strategic Culture.  Mr. Gray, like several others, appears to have confused strategic culture with the broader study of national culture or style that includes an exploration of the attitudes and beliefs that flow from a distinctive national experience, and national behaviour.

It is often presupposed that the modern nation or state has a “clear sense of national identity, a sense that there exists a distinct "us" and that all others are "them"”[2]  This sense of national identity, however, is not only distinct from strategic culture, it may, in fact derive many of its defining core beliefs from its strategic culture and may also preclude a clear understanding of the strategic culture of others.  A nation may be fully cognizant of what it is, but if it does not understand why it is, does not grasp what I call its fundamental strategic culture it cannot consistently understand and respond accurately to potential conflict scenarios with others, with “them”.

Once again I quote Colin Gray  “

Although the Western strategic literature of the past quarter-century is replete with warnings against the practice of mirror-imaging and projecting [ . . .]  desires and perspectives [. . . . ], those warnings by and large proceeded unheeded until the late 1970s”[3].  

Mr. Gray goes on to cite two authors of that time in his exploration of Comparative Strategic Culture: Jack Snyder's RAND report on The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (September 1977),[4] and Ken Booth's book Strategy and Ethnocentrism (1979).  These two documents mark the beginning, more or less, of contemporary exploration of this concept.  Prior references defined this area of interest as political culture and sometimes as national style, debated and discussed at length since the fifties.  Discussions since have circled notions of being able to identify and trace specific national thought and behavior in order to understand why a state thinks and behaves as it does.  It must be possible to identify the fundamentally influencing factors that inform and guide state behaviour specifically in response to perceived threat and opportunity.  If we could, as Mr. Gray points out:

 “the potential benefit for the quality of prediction and understanding of defense performance seems to be overwhelming”. [4]

What appears to be missing in the discussion and debate is any kind of consensus on a definition of strategic culture.  Without this, any prospect of developing a consistently applicable analytic tool or of developing a framework for comparative analysis will remain in the realm of the abstract and the purely hypothetical.  I believe that strategic culture is made up of those key elements that shape not only perception of threat and opportunity, but also a response to the same. I believe that these elements include the physicality and the subsequent core values of an individual, a region, a nation or a state that colour perception and interpretation of their relative survivability in any given situation or set of circumstances.  My research question, therefore, is quite simple.  I want to know as exactly as possible, what is meant by the concept Strategic Culture.  I want to know this so that I can go on to develop a process for Comparative Strategic Culture Analysis.

Faculty Feedback:

Your proposal noted that there was a lack of consensus on a definition of strategic culture, and that in the absence of a commonly-agreed definition, it is not possible to develop a framework or tool that can be used consistently. Your question indicated that you wanted to know exactly what was meant by the concept so you could develop an analytical process.

For me, at any rate, there is a "who" implied in that phrase "what was meant by". Different people have different definitions, and there is no common definition that all can accept. Given that, it seems you would be adding one more definition to the mix, accompanied by a process or framework. Yet if the problem in developing a strong analytic process is the lack of a clear common definition, then the problem seems deeper than a debate over words. While I haven't read extensively in strategic culture, as you have, it interests me that there is such a diversity of opinion, over three generations of scholarship. It seems as if there are deeper issues in dispute.

I wonder if this has in part to do with the reality that no state is an island, and its strategic culture affects how it deals with the rest of the world as well as how that activity is perceived by other nations based on their strategic culture. Thus strategic culture appears to be interactive, and the challenge is at least as much in how to analyze the interaction both on the state-to-state level and at levels such as regionally and at the UN and EU as within an individual state itself. This does seem to be a large question.

Response to Feedback

The research project I am proposing to undertake will attempt to clarify the definition of Strategic Culture, a relatively new concept in International Relations and International Studies.  At first glance this can seem an enormous undertaking, given that there is, as yet, little consensus but instead “a diversity of opinion, over three generations of scholarship.”  It has also been suggested that there may in fact, be “deeper issues in dispute”.

The hypothesis underlying this preliminary quest for a definition is my belief that the problem has thus far been approached from a purely qualitative perspective and has, therefore, been heavily influenced by the epistemology and academic or professional discipline of each respective author.  While this has its validity, I believe it results in a highly subjective and undisciplined interpretation of what should be a fairly straightforward concept.  What I propose to undertake instead is a balance of quantitative and qualitative research.  I plan to sort and organize existing definitions in a manner that will identify elements common to the majority and group these definitions according to those that are purely theoretical definitions and those that have been developed specific to one state.  I also plan to show where the definitions have apparently slipped into the realm of political culture which is quite distinct from strategic culture.  Added to this mix will be information from the fields of Anthropology and Psychology, both of which appear to have more relevant material available than the discipline of Political Science.

The long term objective is to use the definition of Strategic Culture as a starting point in further research to develop a valid and reliable analytic tool for comparative analysis to enhance understanding of the underlying motivators in multilateral interactions both in terms of specific states and their representatives as well as non-state actors. 

 One of the specific benefits of both clarifying the concept and subsequently developing a process for valid and reliable comparative analysis would be an enhanced capacity to recognize and more fully respect the reality not only that “no state is an island” but that each state is unique.  What I believe will become apparent is that an understanding of both your own and other strategic cultures will facilitate a clearer appreciation for projected and assumed values and biases in multilateral interactions.  This would be particularly useful in the development of policy and strategy in contentious or potentially conflicted situations as it would help to inform the same with a better appreciation of how choices might be perceived or misperceived by your own and other nation’s strategic cultures.

 I believe that strategic culture itself is not an interactive concept.  It is an identifiable and analyzable component of an individual, an organization or a state.  It is possessed of a degree of dynamism as it evolves with the development of a nation or a state (or even an individual), but I believe and plan to show that strategic culture is quite simply an individual, organizational or state perception of threat and opportunity and a predisposition to specific types of response choices.  This perception of threat is very much defined by physicality and associated core values.  Strategic Culture is based on how those key elements of physicality and core value shape perceptions of threat and opportunity. 

 Strategic Culture is currently a popular concept in corporate strategizing and can also draw on some of the psychological referents currently used in psychological profiling.  Please note it should have none of the negative connotations associated with criminal profiling.  One of the requirements of the development of a valid analytic tool will necessarily be the use of neutral voice in terminology and descriptors.  But that is anticipated to be a challenge for the development of an analytic process and will not be a part of this preliminary study.

 The large question is not “What is Strategic Culture?” Strategic Culture is the “Why”.   The large question is the “how?” and will not be a part of this study.  If the “why” is not answered, however, it will not be possible to even begin to address how to apply Strategic Culture as a reliable analytic tool for assessing interaction at both the state-to-state level and at NGO levels as well as within individual states.