27 September 2006 Excerpt from Week Four Report “Thinking about Order”

 . . . The events of 9/11 have had an impact on the world system of states.  To argue otherwise is to rely on a very narrow and outdated theoretical State view of the elements that impact on the security today, and indicates an isolationism that is not practical or possible in the world as we know it today.  No state can act exclusively and overtly on its own interests without analysing how those same interests might be compromised by actions that could undermine interstate relations, economic stability, or regional security.  The extent and complexity of the economic, social, cultural, geographic and environmental linkages that join the fortunes of multiple actors precludes this stark realist interpretation of the impact of 9/11.  The US does dominate the world system, but it sits in a position of increasing vulnerability.  The more aggressively the US reacts to challenges to its authority, the more it will both alienate its allies and restrict the civil liberties of it’s own population.  In a sense, the terrorists have won.  If the G8 or core of the civilized world as well as the semi peripheral states decide to follow the lead of the US in the almost exclusive use of force to counter terrorism, the root causes of conflict, increased competition for dwindling resources, will remain un-addressed.      

             The biggest question that ran as a strong undercurrent through most of the readings was that of legality.  The international order, or state system, has an agreed set of protocols, policies and guidelines, as outlined in organisations like the United Nations and NATO, that define acceptable responses to conflict or the threat of conflict.  The United States, since well before 9/11, has manipulated or overtly ignored the same in order to push its own strategic and economic agenda.  The instance specific nature of the agenda is not relevant, except as it is used as a justification.  The bottom line is the impact of this conduct on the integrity, the validity of the “rules of conduct” for the state system.  The international community has done little to challenge unilateral American aggression in the name of counter terrorism and international security.  This failing has weakened not only the international system, but also the credibility of the United States and that of individual international state system member states.  The final result is the potential for incremental degradation of the limits and boundaries of state reaction to human conflict, whether terrorist or state led.  It also opens the way for an increase in sanctioned state terrorism in the name of security.                     

            The articles have helped more to clarify my understanding and terms of reference for the world than change my perceptions.  The article by Colin Gray in particular, reaffirmed my sense that there is a dangerous remnant of the old guard still calling the shots in the state, corporate boardroom and international community - one that is wedded to antiquated perceptions of the overall socio/politico/economic global environment.  The argument that we are not standing at some catastrophic clashing of civilizations was also not revelatory, but did provide reassuring confirmation of my own perceptions.  Of greatest personal relevance however, was the affirmation the articles provided for the direction of my own research into strategic culture analysis.  The influence of the individual and of non-governmental organisations can be better felt now than ever before.  For this influence to be positive and constructive, however, it must be informed and as objective as possible.  Bridging cultural and economic differences can enhance understanding and give a stronger and more credible voice to public demands for accountability and adherence to international codes of state, corporate and individual conduct, whether it be in regards to war, economic development or environmental degradation. 

              From a purely theoretical perspective, it was interesting to see the shift, from article to article, and I doubt that this was accidental, from an individual theoretical perspective, to that of the state, to a system overview or examination of the responsibilities of the state system.  References to theory were not always clearly identified, but they certainly coloured the perceptions of the respective authors.  Colin Gray made the only overt claim to a specific realist  theoretical perspective and as such his reasoning is flawed.  He is not looking at the state system, or the state for that matter, as it is.  He is looking back to what was.  His smug self-assurance that nothing has changed, and that the state will always serve its own needs obscures his view of reality as it exists today.  The state cannot self-serve all that effectively in isolation any more.

 The final theoretical picture that comes from the readings is one of a state system, driven by the core but closely followed by the periphery, to explore a more collaborative approach to regional and international conflict management. The post 9/11 perception of the “enemy” is too elusive and mobile for the ready application of traditional state sanctioned violence as an impediment or countermeasure.  The articles also indicated the positive impact of trans-national linkages that ran counter to ideologies and borders.  I am not sure of the theoretical model for this, but from my own analysis this represents a growing awareness, at the individual level, of a greater human community, with the capacity to be heard and parallels early human evolution from loosely associated bands, to clans, tribes and eventually stable agrarian communities and city states.  We are simply moving along our human societal development path.

  I found the Rosenau reading to be most useful in exploring these articles.  The straightforward ladder of abstraction was quite useful.  It made it possible to start with the simple components of the situation and build from there.  The question ‘of what is this an instance’, coupled with the incremental ladder approach, kept the information from overwhelming to the point of intellectual paralysis.  Raw observations indicated that violence had been perpetrated in an arena where it was unfamiliar, American soil.  This triggered outrage on the part of the US, but also shook folks up throughout the “civilized” world.  If the US was not safe, who was?  Like an anthill kicked over, state leaders and political analysts scurried about to make sense of what, in the final analysis, was just another example of large scale, unexpected human conflict/carnage.  The real issue was not the bombing.  It was how the US and subsequently the world responded.  The bombing was not anomalous.  Refinement of theory allows a pattern to emerge from the events surrounding the isolated incident.  The pattern is that of a hegemonic power, yet again, reacting unilaterally to perceived incursions on its hegemony while the world system shuffles its feet and pays lip service to the international institutions established to ensure civil conduct among states. Apparently the majority of states see more value in maintaining a harmonious relationship with the US than supporting the collective will of the majority of the states.  This, ultimately calls into question the validity of the international organisations and their state delegated authority to ensure international stability.  Are we, in reality, drifting towards a new bi-polarity between the US and its adherents and the rest of the world and the dissolution of any semblance of collaborative international order?  Or is this simply an instance of the guy who owns the bat and ball threatening to cancel the game if he can’t have his way?  Do we succumb to our need to have the game go on, or do we find an alternate game?

 In the final analysis, so what?  What does it all mean?  I believe it means we are faced with choices.  9/11 has shown us, if it wasn’t already apparent, who calls the tune to which we currently dance.  Top down change will not happen easily as the state exists to preserve and perpetuate the state.  Bottom up change, however, has never been more possible.  The old axioms of think globally and act locally still apply.  In our day to day lives we can work towards better understanding and responsibility.  We can ask the same of our government, locally, regionally and nationally.  We can invest our purchasing dollars in corporations that best represent our values and ideals.  In short, we can move past immediate gain and short term self-gratification to better long term strategic planning.  Because if we can’t manage that kind of conduct at the individual level, we can’t really expect it at the national or international level.

07 Sep. 2006 - Of note in first reading assignments:  International Relations Theory Today, Ken Booth and Steve Smith.  "History is a series of dominations" pg 5 . .  Given that I do not see some rose coloured, utopian, war free, future for humanity, the notion of Comparative Strategic Culture Analysis as a tool to enable rational and enlightened 'dominance' as a means of mitigating conflict is one worth considering.  It would certainly make the concept easier to sell, fund etc.