Security Implications of Selective Intervention in Regional Conflicts:

Rwanda and Afghanistan

There have been approximately 316 episodes of armed conflict in the world in the period from 1945 to 2005 (Monty G. Marshall, Director, Center for Systemic Peace).  The international community, on the basis of consensually agreed guidelines, policies and practices, has intervened in approximately 63 regional conflicts in that same time frame.  (UN and NATO web sites). The apparent subjective selectivity of multilateral intervention, however, on the part of nations purporting to support the principles of multilateral conflict resolution, has served to undermine the credibility of the intervention process itself to the point where it has, in fact, undermined international security.  The key issue is that of delegated authority.  Within a state, authority is delegated, by the government, to a set of laws as well as to the judicial system and a policing agency to ensure adherence to these laws.  If the leadership or government of the state places itself above the laws it has authorized, it undermines its own authority.  The same holds true in multilateral agreements between states.  In the event that a signatory state puts itself above consistent adherence to consensually defined parameters of conduct in identifying and resolving regional conflict, the authority empowering the multilateral agreement itself is undermined.  Eventually it will simply be null and void.

This paper proposes to compare the example of intervention in Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 with that of intervention in Afghanistan from 1988 to today to illustrate this selective application of policies and practices.  The comparison also plans to look briefly at the prevailing circumstances that influenced the intervention process to further support the claim of subjective intervention selection on the part of specific nations and the long term implications of that selectivity.  The conclusion will point to a critical need for the international community to reiterate or redefine and objectively uphold the criteria for intervention in regional conflicts.  It will also attempt to draw attention to the need, at the state level, to revisit and clarify why participating nations have chosen involvement in a multilateral system in the first place.  

Rethinking Conflict and International Security

(A Deconstructive, Post Modern, Critical Perspective on 21st Century Conflict and Inter-Nation Security)

“If the great powers were to go to war with one another just once more, using all the weapons they now have, a million people could die each minute.  They have no current intention of doing that, but so long as the old structures survive, Big War is not dead.  It is just on holiday.”  ‘War – The New Edition’ by Gwynne Dyer, Random House Canada 2004.

Just as the face of conflict has changed, so do we need to re-examine how we perceive and respond to conflict.  Traditional theoretical models of analysis are insufficient to the task when confronted with the pervasive and sometimes subtle linkages and interdependencies of a highly globalized world.  The great powers have achieved a modicum of mutual accord but are subjectively discriminatory in choosing when and where to collaborate on intervention. Choices are justified with fine rhetoric about human rights, terrorism, regional stability and the established due processes of recognized international organizations.  This subjectivity, however, can be short sighted and could lead to an unexpected and cascading spill over of an isolated conflict that had been disregarded as localized and outside the mandate of international concerns. Such a critical oversight could ultimately lead to an escalation and expansion of tensions beyond the original isolated locale sufficient to re-polarize the great and middle powers and put an end to mutual accord.

It is my contention that the international community of great and middle powers has evolved to the point where it is ready for the development and application of more critical theoretical international models of conflict analysis that can look objectively beyond, in time and scope, the traditional immediate and mid term great power interests.  State-centric planning to safeguard access to resources and ensure strategic advantage is outdated and insufficient to effectively address the long term implications of intervention in either immediately relevant conflict situations like Afghanistan or apparently isolated regional and intra-state conflicts like Rwanda.  Asymmetric threat, ready access to portable weapons of mass destruction, instant international communication and a highly mobile population present a dynamic and elusive face to traditional conflict/risk assessment.  

This paper intends, briefly, to compare the immediate and historical events leading up to both Afghanistan and Rwanda and discuss probable great and middle power perceptions of the strategic and economic value of both regions to support the argument of traditional biases informing intervention decisions.  The paper will conclude with an examination of the obvious and the overlooked potential long term implications of the intervention choices made in these two areas of conflict and the nature of a theoretical model that might have proved more useful.

So the first attempt contained ideas for 10 papers, the second ideas for about 7 papers - let's see if the third time is indeed the lucky one . .

OK, third try pending - and will use this sentence as a starting point.  This proposed paper intends to show that timely and coordinated multilateral intervention - political, economic or military - in civil and regional conflicts, can often be essential, not for moralistic reasons, but for practical strategic and economic purposes.  This possibility tends to be overlooked by short sighted and tunnel visioned strategic planners.  Hmmm - possibility that prolonged political and economic stability diminish insecurity to the point where complacency compromises effective situational analysis?  No wait - that's still another paper!  I'm back up to 2 already!

1.    Threats to national and international security today have moved from traditional inter-state conflict into the realm of unpredictable, asymmetric and often emotionally charged ethnocentric conflicts. 

2.    International mechanisms and organizations established to resolve or mitigate conflict, such as the UN and NATO are often hampered in their ability to respond adequately and in a timely manner by the reluctance and even indifference of the affluent and stable member states, the power elite (re-label). 

3.    There also seems to be a direct correlation between the speed of military intervention and the perceived economic or strategic value of the effected region (Kuwait/Rwanda, Iraq/the Sudan). 

4.    This proposed paper intends to show that timely and coordinated multilateral intervention - political, economic or military - in civil and regional conflicts, can often be essential, not for moralistic reasons, but for practical strategic and economic purposes. 

5.    The paper will draw on statistics and information from sources such as the UN and the World Bank to illustrate the impact of poverty on contemporary conflict as well as the cascading impact of apparently isolated civil and regional conflict that can carry to the more stable and affluent areas of the world. 

6.    The argument will include the premis that a successful international security strategy need have no basis on altruism to include safeguards for fundamental human rights and a shared commitment to a more equitable distribution of economic well being.  Ten percent of the worlds population control over 50% of the worlds wealth (World Bank).  This kind of inequity is politically and economically destabilizing in that it increases incidences of non-productive conflict, or reactive emotional violence, and diminishes global consumer capability. 

7.    The final point in the paper will be theoretical in nature and will contend that any effective international strategy must incorporate a efficient and consistent means of objectively assessing any situation from the multiple perspectives of all the players in order to better understand the long term implications of proposed resolution or avoidance strategies.

09 September 2006 - Re-think below - use this opportunity as a starting point – Introduce the concept of International Strategic Theory (it must pre-exist somewhere!) as a precursor to Comparative Strategic Culture as an analytic tool  . . .

1.    The key, as I see it is to understand WHY people, states and organizations act as they do - Identify individual, state and corporate self interest as a realistic means of mitigating and manipulating regional and international conflict  -  as opposed to altruism as the motivator. That would be wishful thinking.  Altruism is subjective and unpredictable.  In the face of diminishing resources and expanding competition for those resources it will also vanish. - Survival, and its cousin Greed, are far more reliable factors in situational analysis and event projection.  An unstable world is not good for business anyway!  There is profit in managed conflict, but not protracted and exponentially escalating violence.  It's costly in terms of wasted manpower, lost infrastructure and unsalvageable materiel resources - it also makes for a hostile and economically crippled consumer base. 

2.    For a nation to ensure its share of the global economic pie it must identify and consolidate a key role as one of the power elite (re-label) in enlightened global domination/manipulation.  Security through collective enlightened domination by a power elite. 

3.    National security, furthermore, is no longer possible as a stand alone.  Isolationism is a solid bid for economic decline.  It is essential to sustainable national economic health/growth to ensure proactive engagement in international socio-political-strategic planning. 

4.    As in any situation it is also advisable to base planning on resources available and build out from there.  What does Canada have?  Natural resources, arable living space and a highly educated and talented population – albeit lazy and colonial in their thinking.  These resources are also a double edged sword.  If we don't use them and protect them, how long will they be ours? 

(Sad statement - Canadians readily recognize American film stars and politicians but cannot recognize members of their own government or their military, even when in uniform.  I am so tired of being mistaken in my work dress for building security or mall information.)

5.    The subjects indicated for the paper submission include conflict resolution and non-traditional threats to security.  I would like to address both in an examination of Comparative Strategic Culture Analysis as a Tool Enlightened Domination as a Means to International Peace and Security.  (what a mouthful)

6.    My argument will derive from the premis that conflict is inevitable as a part of the human experience.  In the face of increased competition for dwindling resources among growing populations, furthermore, conflict will occur more often, become more intense, and will manifest more and more often in non-traditional forms.

6.    The Power Elite (re-label), those nations, corporations and non-governmental organizations with the means and the reach to do so - will dominate. They always have.  If this domination is reactive and protectionist/isolationist it will find itself increasingly hard pressed to avert or mitigate conflict.  It will instead, increase the gap between the power elite and the growing ranks of the politically and economically disenfranchised or marginalized. 

7.    I believe the solution, in part, lies in the development of a theoretical analytic tool, Comparative Strategic Culture Analysis, which will enable a more objective understanding by the Power Elite of the real issues underlying conflict, and support more proactive strategic planning and resource management/distribution/protection.  Such an analytic tool could also ensure a higher degree of accountability and responsibility (enlightenment?) on the part of the Power Elite. 

8.    Comparative Strategic Culture Analysis, or Political Culture Analysis, or Strategic Behavioural Analysis, has yet to achieve consensus in terms of a clear definition.  I believe part of the problem lies in approach.  International Relations Theory has evolved from a study of the “what” to the “how” and I propose the evolution continue on to the “how”.  The theory of Strategic Culture Analysis is not new.  It has long been argued that the key to defeating your adversaries is to know them.  I submit that if you can know not just the what and the how of your adversary, but the why, you will be better able to anticipate areas of conflict and areas of convergence in your own strategic planning. 

9.    Better yet, if you apply the same analytic tool to your own Strategic Culture, you will be better able to understand and offset your own potential for subjective, reactive, strategic planning, as an individual, as an organization and/or as a nation state. 

10.    The bottom line – someone has to take charge.  If one can create a means that will increase the likelihood that the Power Elite is not a bully, but an enlightened example of informed leadership, conflict and non-traditional threats to security can be better anticipated, channeled and redirected into constructive (or les destructive) outbursts of human energy.  This scenario is also more likely to draw better consensus within the international community of states and non-governmental agencies, further reducing the likelihood of escalating outbursts of conflict.